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  INTRODUCTION   
The sexual practices of a small percentage of Americans 
are costing the American public billions of dollars each year. 
The United States has the highest sexually transmitted disease 
(STD)1 infection rate in the industrialized world, a rate fifty to 
one hundred times that of other industrialized countries.2 There 
is a multitude of reasons why the sexual disease rate in the 
United States is out of control. This Article discusses tort law’s 
role in allowing some Americans to view sex and sexual part-
ners with no regard for safety or health, and concludes that the 
current negligence-based analysis in sex tort3 cases should be 
replaced by strict liability. 
The law can directly affect public opinion and behavior 
through its deterrent, expressive, and educational functions.4 
While various other forms of state action are vitally important 
to controlling social threats,5 tort law is the barometer of mini-
mal civil expectations in interpersonal relations. Prior to the 
mid-twentieth century, sex tort law offered protection against 
reputation and emotional injury resulting from unfair or 
fraudulently induced seduction, but the “heartbalm” torts were 
substantially eviscerated in the latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury. As a result, a “caveat emptor” standard in sex tort actions 
 
 1. Formerly referred to as venereal disease (VD), sexually transmitted 
diseases (STDs) and sexually transmitted infections (STIs) collectively include 
a number of infections that affect human genitalia and are transmitted sexu-
ally. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC: CONFRONTING SEXUALLY 
TRANSMITTED DISEASES 1–2 (Thomas R. Eng & William T. Butler eds., 1997) 
[hereinafter THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC]; Barbara K. Hecht & Frederick Hecht 
Condoms and Sexually Transmitted Infections, MEDICINENET.COM, July 7, 
2004, http://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=33590. 
 2. AM. SOC. HEALTH ASS’N, SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES: HOW 
MANY CASES AND AT WHAT COST? 10 (Linda L. Alexander et al. eds., 1998), 
available at http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/1445-std_rep.cfm [hereinafter 
ASHA—WHAT COST?]; Mary G. Leary, Tort Liability for Sexually Transmitted 
Disease, in 88 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 1, at 153 (2003). 
 3. I coined the phrase “sex tort” to refer to any conduct actionable in tort 
relating to sexual conduct, including sexual fraud and battery. However, this 
Article focuses exclusively on sexual relations resulting in disease transmis-
sion. 
 4. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Theory of Social Interests, 15 PAPERS & PROC. 
AM. SOC. SOC’Y 16, 16–17, 20–23 (1920). Tort doctrine is intended to control 
social choices by deterring socially undesirable, blameworthy, or uneconomical 
behavior, and to provide compensation to victims of civil wrongdoing. See DAN 
B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 17–21 (2000). 
 5. Examples of such essential state action include compulsory education 
for minors and criminal law enforcement. 
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emerged. This standard has probably contributed to the major 
epidemic of STDs that has developed in the United States in 
the last thirty years6 by failing to discourage irresponsible sex-
ual practices. 
The urgency of a national sexual disease epidemic necessi-
tates a reassessment of the proper standard in cases alleging 
sexual misconduct. Courts have engaged a negligence-based 
paradigm in sexual disease cases based on historical precedent 
in contagious disease cases. However, courts’ opinions in these 
cases reflect tension between anti-heartbalm sentiment and the 
public policy of slowing the disease rate by all means, including 
tort liability. This tension, coupled with the general fact-
intensive case-by-case negligence analysis, has resulted in un-
clear legal standards and very uncertain liability, even in cases 
of clear causation. The negligence-based paradigm deters sex-
ual disease lawsuits and fails to deter sexual disease perpetra-
tors. This paradigm in turn contributes to the “hidden” nature 
of the sexual disease epidemic and does not further the law’s 
compensatory, deterrent, and educational goals. 
Although modification of tort law is not the sole remedy for 
America’s STD problem, such a modification could help tort law 
address the problem much more effectively than it currently 
does. Adopting a strict liability approach to sexual disease 
transmission in lieu of the current negligence standard would 
further the public policies of encouraging accountability by forc-
ing disease perpetrators to internalize the costs of their behav-
ior, providing a greater likelihood of compensation to victims, 
and, ultimately, educating the public about the very serious 
and pervasive health threat at hand. 
This paper will proceed in three parts. Part I will focus on 
the facts of sexual disease, including data relating to the num-
ber of infections in the United States, the resultant annual 
medical costs, and the actors responsible for the high infection 
rate. Part II will briefly review the history of sex tort jurispru-
dence in America over the past century and will describe cur-
rent sex tort law’s inefficient negligence-based jurisprudence 
relative to the new wave of sex tort litigation based on disease 
transmission. Part III will argue that strict liability is a supe-
rior theory of sex tort liability in accordance with traditional 
 
 6. Medical Institute for Sexual Health, The STD Epidemic (1994), 
http://www.wprc.org/10.23.0.0.1.0.phtml; see also THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, su-
pra note 1, passim. 
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tort doctrine, economic choice theory, behavioral choice theory, 
and the expressive function of law. 
I.  THE STATE’S INTEREST IN SLOWING THE SPREAD OF 
SEXUAL DISEASE   
“The health of the people is an economic asset. The law recog-
nizes its preservation as a matter of importance to the state. To 
the individual nothing is more valuable than health.”7 
 
America’s sexual disease rate is unprecedented and unpar-
alleled. Immediate attention to this issue is required at every 
level of government in order to educate the public and slow dis-
ease transmission. Nearly ten years ago, the Institute of Medi-
cine made the following statement: 
STDs are hidden epidemics of enormous health and economic conse-
quence in the United States. . . . All Americans have an interest in 
STD prevention because all communities are impacted by STDs and 
all individuals directly or indirectly pay for the costs of these diseases. 
. . . To successfully prevent STDs, many stakeholders need to redefine 
their mission, refocus their efforts, modify how they deliver services, 
and accept new responsibilities. In this process, strong leadership, in-
novative thinking, partnerships, and adequate resources will be re-
quired. The additional investment required to effectively prevent 
STDs may be considerable, but it is negligible when compared with 
the likely return on the investment. The process of preventing STDs 
must be a collaborative one. No agency, organization, or sector can ef-
fectively do it alone; all members of the community must do their 
part. A successful national initiative to confront and prevent STDs 
requires widespread public awareness and participation and bold na-
tional leadership from the highest levels.8 
This Article focuses exclusively on changes to tort law that 
will meet the goal of slowing the sexual disease transmission 
rate better than current tort law jurisprudence. Changes to tort 
law are but one piece of a critical larger project to minimize the 
tragic consequences that result from sexual disease. 
A. THE FACTS REGARDING THE SEXUAL DISEASE EPIDEMIC IN 
AMERICA 
Sexually transmitted diseases, or STDs, are caused by 
more than twenty-five infectious organisms that are transmit-
 
 7. Skillings v. Allen, 173 N.W. 663, 664 (Minn. 1919). 
 8. INST. OF MED., THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC: CONFRONTING SEXUALLY 
TRANSMITTED DISEASES: SUMMARY 43 (1997). 
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ted through sexual activity.9 In the 1960s, the only significant 
STDs were syphilis and gonorrhea, both of which were easily 
cured with antibiotics.10 Since 1980, however, at least eight 
new STDs have been identified, including HIV/AIDS.11 STDs 
accounted for eighty-seven percent of all cases among the top 
ten most frequently reported infections in the United States 
during 1995.12 Five of the top ten reportable13 infectious dis-
eases in 1995 were either exclusively or largely transmitted 
during sex, including the top four: chlamydia, gonorrhea, AIDS, 
and syphilis.14 Currently, it is estimated that between seventy 
and one hundred million Americans have been infected with an 
STD, with 15.3 million new cases15 of STDs among Americans 
every year, including three million new cases of STDs annually 
among American teenagers.16 In 1993, a review of actual causes 
of death in the United States estimated that thirty thousand 
deaths occurred as a result of unprotected intercourse, leading 
to the finding that “unprotected intercourse now represents one 
of the most rapidly increasing causes of death in the country.”17 
 
 9. Ziad A. Memish & Abimbola O. Osoba, Sexually Transmitted Diseases 
and Travel, 21 INT’L J. ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS 131, 131, abstr. (2003). 
 10. Medical Institute for Sexual Health, supra note 6; cf. Kathleen K. v. 
Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that genital 
herpes was “not listed among the ‘venereal diseases’ covered by the California 
Health and Safety Code” because “that section was enacted in 1957, long be-
fore herpes” was considered a threat to public health). 
 11. THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra note 1, at 39. For definitions and symp-
toms of the most common STDs, see Leary, supra note 2, § 2. 
 12. THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra note 1, at 28. 
 13. “Reportable” means that health care providers are required to report 
cases to state health departments and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC). ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra note 2, at 4; see also THE HID-
DEN EPIDEMIC, supra note 1, at 196 (“Syphilis and gonorrhea are reportable 
conditions in all . . . states.”). 
 14. THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra note 1, at 28. 
 15. Id. There is a difference between the number of cases of STDs and the 
number of people infected, because the same very sexually active core group 
members are contracting multiple infections, and each infection is counted as 
a case. Thus, the case number will exceed the number of people infected. Tele-
phone Interview with Professor Ed Laumann, Professor of Sociology, Univ. of 
Chicago, in Chicago, Ill. (Aug. 3, 2005). 
 16. THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra note 1, at 28; see also ASHA—WHAT 
COST?, supra note 2, at 8, 12; Douglas T. Fleming et al., Herpes Simplex Virus 
Type 2 in the United States, 1976 to 1994, 337 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1105, 1105–
11 (1997). 
 17. J. Michael McGinnis & William H. Foege, Actual Causes of Death in 
the United States, 18 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2207, 2210 (1993). At least twenty-five 
diseases are spread primarily through sexual activity. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG: HOW BIG IS THE STD EPIDEMIC IN THE U.S.? 1 
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While the public may believe that AIDS is the most dangerous 
STD, this belief does not reflect the disease’s relatively low 
prevalence.18 HIV/AIDS is not the only STD that is life-
threatening; left untreated, diseases such as gonorrhea, syphi-
lis, genital herpes, and the human papilloma virus can cause 
serious health consequences, lead to various forms of cancer, 
and kill.19 
Bacterial STDs, such as chlamydia,20 gonorrhea, syphilis, 
and trichomoniasis, are usually cured with antibiotic treatment 
and rendered non-infectious if detected,21 although researchers 
 
(1998), http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/upload/the-tip-of-the-iceberg-how-big 
-is-the-STD-epidemic-in-the-u-s-q-a.pdf [hereinafter TIP OF THE ICEBERG]. 
Further, the CDC has concluded that STDs remain one of the most “under 
recognized” health problems in the United States. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, TRACKING THE HIDDEN EPIDEMICS: TRENDS IN STDS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2000) [hereinafter CDC—TRENDS]; see also INST. OF 
MED., supra note 8, at 1–4. 
 18. It is an established principle of public health law that a health risk 
that causes a less serious health problem (such as serious illness and possibly 
cancer, leading to death, i.e., genital herpes) can have a much larger impact on 
overall public health if it affects a larger percentage of the population than a 
health risk that has a higher probability of causing death (such as AIDS) but 
affects a much smaller percentage of the population. See, e.g., Geoffrey Rose, 
Sick Individuals and Sick Populations, 14 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 32, 37 
(1985).  
 19. EDWARD O. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUAL-
ITY 377 (1994). 
 20. Chlamydia trachomatis is the second most common bacterial infection 
in the United States. ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra note 2, at 5, 16–17. In 1996, 
there were three million new cases of chlamydia and 650,000 new cases of 
gonorrhea. Id. These curable bacterial infections are largely asymptomatic, 
with 75% of women and 50% of men unaware of their chlamydia infection, and 
many women unaware that they have gonorrhea. CDC—TRENDS, supra note 
17, at 6, 9. If left untreated, up to 40% of women with chlamydia will develop 
pelvic inflammatory disease (PID); gonorrhea is also a major cause of PID. Id. 
PID in turn causes infertility in 20% of women who have it, and at least 15% 
of all infertile American women are infertile because of tubal damage caused 
by PID. INST. OF MED., supra note 8, at 5. Ectopic pregnancy results in 9% of 
PID cases, “making ectopic pregnancy one of the leading and most preventable 
causes of maternal death during pregnancy.” Id. The highest rate of acute in-
fection requiring hospitalization for chlamydia is among teenagers between 
the ages of fifteen and nineteen. Pregnancy Ctrs. of Cent. Va., Teen Sex and 
Pregnancy Fact Sheet, http://www.virginiapregnancy.org/teenfacts.html (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Teen Sex Fact Sheet]. It is estimated that 
one in four sexually active teens have chlamydia, and that 75% of infected 
young women and 25% of infected young men have no symptoms. Id. 
 21. Although bacterial strains, such as gonorrhea, typically can be cured 
using antimicrobial drugs, the effectiveness of these drugs has become limited 
because of the strains’ increasing resistance to the drugs. See, e.g., J. Todd 
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believe that the majority of infected persons are unaware that 
they are infected.22 If left untreated, bacterial STDs can cause 
pelvic inflammatory disease (PID) in women, which can lead to 
infertility and chronic pain.23 
Half of all new STD infections are viral and incurable.24 
Viral STDs, such as genital herpes (HSV-2 or Herpes Simplex 
II), human papilloma virus (HPV), hepatitis B, and AIDS are 
incurable and may be transmitted throughout the life of the 
carrier.25 Genital herpes and HPV are sharply on the rise,26 
and in 1998 accounted for sixty-five of the approximately sixty-
eight million infections among Americans.27 HPV and genital 
herpes are rapidly infecting Americans and can lead to tragic 
consequences, including cancer and death. 
Genital herpes is the most common viral STD in the 
United States.28 The number of Americans infected with herpes 
grew by 30% between the late 1970s and late 1990s,29 such that 
at least 20% of persons over age twelve in the United States—
forty-five million Americans—had genital herpes as of 1998.30 
Some researchers believe that the number of symptomatic 
cases of herpes in the Unites States grew eleven fold during the 
1970s and 1980s.31 “Complications associated with genital her-
pes include meningitis, cervical cancer, miscarriage, premature 
 
Weber, Appropriate Use of Antimicrobial Drugs, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2354, 
2356 (2005). 
 22. See CDC—TRENDS, supra note 17, at 9; INST. OF MED., supra note 8, 
at 7–8; Barbara Moscicki et al., The Use and Limitations of Endocervical 
Gram Stains and Mucopurulent Cervicitis as Predictors for Chlamydia Tra-
chomatis in Female Adolescents, 157 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 65, 
65, 70 (1987). 
 23. CDC—TRENDS, supra note 17, at 6–9; INST. OF MED., supra note 8, at 
5. 
 24. ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra note 2, at 5; CDC—TRENDS, supra note 
17, at 1–2. 
 25. ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra note 2, at 5. 
 26. See, e.g., B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175, 1178 n.7 (Md. 1988) (“[Genital 
herpes] is spreading rapidly in the United States.” (alteration in original)). 
 27. ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra note 2, at 5. This figure is no doubt 
higher today, eight years after this study was conducted, as around fifteen 
million new cases occur every year in the United States. Id. at 4. 
 28. CDC—TRENDS, supra note 17, at 20. 
 29. Id.; TIP OF THE ICEBERG, supra note 17, at 5; see also Fleming, supra 
note 16, at 1109 tbl.5 (documenting the changes in the number of people who 
tested positive for HSV-2 from 1976 to 1980 and from 1988 to 1994). 
 30. TIP OF THE ICEBERG, supra note 17, at 2, 5. 
 31. ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra note 2, at 17. 
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delivery, and high mortality rate of babies born to mothers with 
herpes.”32 
HPV is one of the two most common new cases of STDs in 
the United States, the other being trichomoniasis.33 These two 
diseases account for 70% of new STD cases each year.34 An es-
timated 20 million Americans currently have HPV and another 
5.5 million are infected every year.35 Researchers in Seattle re-
cently estimated that 80% of sexually active Americans will ac-
quire at least one strain of HPV at some point in their lives.36 
There are at least thirty distinct strains of HPV that can infect 
human genitalia, some of which cause genital warts.37 Some 
strains are controlled by the body’s immune system without the 
carrier ever knowing about the infection.38 But the more dan-
gerous strains cause “subclinical” infections, so-called because 
they are invisible and often go undetected or may lie dormant 
for years.39 At least some of these strains lead to a variety of 
cancers, including cancer of the cervix, vagina, vulva, anus, and 
penis.40 HPV may cause more than 90% of all cases of cervical 
cancer, the seventh most common type of cancer in women,41 
 
 32. R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 107 n.5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing 
B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175, 1178 n.7 (Md. 1988)). 
 33. Trichomoniasis is caused by a microscopic parasite, and is therefore 
curable. CDC—TRENDS, supra note 17, at 24; see ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra 
note 2, at 6. If left untreated, it increases the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS, 
and can cause premature birth and low birth weight babies among infected 
pregnant women. CDC—TRENDS, supra note 17, at 24. There is currently no 
national surveillance data on trichomoniasis, but it is estimated that five mil-
lion new cases of trichomoniasis occur each year in the United States. TIP OF 
THE ICEBERG, supra note 17, at 2. This disease accounts for half of all curable 
STIs worldwide. ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra note 2, at 18. Yet, only 2% of 
men and 3% of women named trichomoniasis when asked to identify known 
STDs. TIP OF THE ICEBERG, supra note 17, at 4. 
 34. ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra note 2, at 20. 
 35. See CDC—TRENDS, supra note 17, at 2. 
 36. DANIEL E. MONTAÑO ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: RESULTS FROM 
HPV PROVIDER SURVEY: KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES, AND PRACTICES ABOUT 
GENITAL HPV INFECTION AND RELATED CONDITIONS 1 (2005), http://www.cdc 
.gov/std/hpv/HPVProviderSurveyExecSum.pdf. 
 37. CDC—TRENDS, supra note 17, at 18. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.; see INST. OF MED., supra note 8, at 8. Four strains of HPV, types 
16, 18, 31, and 45, account for 80% of all cervical cancer. See CDC—TRENDS, 
supra note 17, at 18. 
 40. CDC—TRENDS, supra note 17, at 18; INST. OF MED., supra note 8, at 4. 
 41. INST. OF MED., supra note 8, at 4. 
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killing about five thousand women every year in the United 
States.42 
More recent research indicates that there are 6.2 million 
new cases of HPV annually, driving these figures higher.43 
There is no cure for HPV;44 it causes the largest number of 
STD-related life-threatening illnesses next to AIDS,45 and it is 
the fastest-growing STD in the United States.46 One of the big-
gest problems with HPV is that research shows that condoms 
may have little, if any, effect on preventing this disease.47 Yet, 
of Americans polled, only 8% of men and 13% of women were 
able to identify HPV as a common STD when asked to name 
STDs of which they had heard.48 
Americans’ lack of knowledge about HPV is representative 
of a more generalized ignorance about STDs. The American 
public is frighteningly unaware of the STD epidemic, with sur-
veys showing that around 70% of men and women think that 
fewer than 10% of Americans will get an STD in their lifetime, 
although the true figure is at least 25%,49 with recent estimates 
as high as 80%.50 In 1993, 84% of women surveyed were not 
concerned about acquiring an STD, including 72% of young 
women (18–24) and 78% of women who reported having “many” 
sexual partners.51 In general, the health consequences of STDs 
are “hidden” from public attention for several reasons, includ-
ing the fact that most people who have an STD do not know 
 
 42. TIP OF THE ICEBERG, supra note 17, at 4. One particular type of HPV, 
type 16, is responsible for 50% of all cases of cervical cancer. MEDICAL COL-
LEGE OF WISCONSIN, HEALTHLINK, http://healthlink.mcs.edu/article/ 
976735469.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).  
 43. MONTAÑO ET AL., supra note 36, at 1. 
 44. CDC—TRENDS, supra note 17, at 18. 
 45. INST. OF MED., supra note 8, at 6. 
 46. See ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra note 2, at 5. 
 47. See MONTAÑO ET AL., supra note 36, at 2. “Although the effect of con-
doms in preventing HPV is inconclusive,” condoms can reduce the risk of two 
of the most common HPV-related conditions: genital warts and cervical cancer. 
Id. 
 48. TIP OF THE ICEBERG, supra note 17, at 4. While clinicians generally 
are aware of the prevalence of HPV, only 63% knew that genital HPV in men 
increases the risk of penile and anogential cancers. MONTAÑO ET AL., supra 
note 36, at 6. 
 49. ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra note 2, at 10. The surveys were conducted 
in 1998 by the Kaiser Family Foundation and Glamour magazine. Id.  
 50. See MONTAÑO ET AL., supra note 36, at 2. 
 51. EDK ASSOC., WOMEN & SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES: THE DAN-
GERS OF DENIAL 6 tbl.1 (1994). 
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that they have one.52 Major health consequences of STDs, such 
as infertility, cancer, and chronic pain, occur years after the 
initial infection, so the link between the STD and the health 
consequences is not recognized. Also, the stigma attached to 
contracting an STD inhibits open public discourse, education, 
and legal redress.53 Americans of all ages are confronted with 
 
 52. See CDC—TRENDS, supra note 17, at 9; INST. OF MED., supra note 8, 
at 7–8. The silent nature of the STD epidemic is probably the greatest public 
health threat. ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra note 2, at 8. In general, STDs are 
more severe and occur more frequently among women, in part because they 
are transmitted most readily from a male to a female, and in part because 
they are more likely to remain undetected in females. INST. OF MED., supra 
note 8, at 3. Almost every STD can be transmitted from a pregnant woman to 
her fetus, which, because of the immature immune system of the fetus, results 
in tragic consequences, including low birth weight, premature birth, conjunc-
tivitis, pneumonia, neurologic problems, and congenital abnormalities. 
ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra note 2, at 9. STDs can also be transmitted to ba-
bies through breastfeeding. INST. OF MED., supra note 8, at 2. 
 53. Relative to other societies American sexuality is largely private and 
secret, a vestige of the Victorian social system. See ALLAN M. BRANDT, NO 
MAGIC BULLET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF VENEREAL DISEASE IN THE UNITED 
STATES SINCE 1980, at 23–31 (1985). Social taboos regarding sexuality juxta-
posed with constant sexual images in the mass media, and particularly the 
Internet, have created a culture where sexual cognitive dissonance is ubiqui-
tous, which leads to unhealthy sexual behavior such as promiscuous, clandes-
tine sex. THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra note 1, at 86–107. American attitudes 
toward sex have impeded sexuality and STD education programs, hindered 
communications among family members, and promoted a fixation on sexuality. 
Id. Contrary to the popular assumption that Victorian values have caused 
sexual repression in America, Michel Foucault has argued that American dis-
course and fixation on sex is more about producing and using sex as power 
than about repression. MICHAEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, 
VOLUME I: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley trans., 1978). That is, sexual 
choices derive their meaning through social discourse about sex, through la-
beling people in accordance with their sexuality, and otherwise through so-
cially constructing meaning grounded in sexual behavior. Id. at 17–49. Ameri-
can secrecy regarding sex and the attendant lack of communication and 
education regarding STDs, coupled with a proliferation of sexual images in the 
mass media and increased sexuality in American youth, have created a recipe 
for the very serious STD epidemic we face today. THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, su-
pra note 1, at 86–107. For example, there are ten incidents of sexual behavior 
per hour on prime time television, but most of the images depict non-marital 
sexual relationships as the norm and fail to broach the subject of contraception 
or sexual disease. Id. at 92. This irresponsible production has an enormous 
impact on young people’s sexual mores. See, e.g., D.T. Lowry & J.A. Schidler, 
Prime Time TV Portrayals of Sex, “Safe Sex,” and AIDS: A Longitudinal 
Analysis, 70 JOURNALISM Q. 628 (1993) (detailing the impact of television on 
adolescent sexuality). Such productions are, however protected by the First 
Amendment. See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 US 
803, 823–27 (2000). 
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an enormous health risk that is largely silent.54 
The impact of STDs on America’s youth is particularly 
troublesome.55 Adolescents and young adults have the highest 
rates of sexually transmitted diseases.56 Approximately twenty-
five percent of new STD cases involve fifteen- to nineteen-year 
olds.57 About half of all new HIV infections occur in people un-
der age twenty-five; most are infected through sex.58 AIDS is 
the sixth leading cause of death among young men and 
women.59 Every day, eight thousand teenagers in the United 
States contract an STD—approximately three million per year, 
 
 54. Over half of adults and teens surveyed stated that their doctors spent 
“no time at all” discussing STDs with them. ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra note 
2, at 10; see also THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra note 1, at 86–107 (discussing 
the impact of silence and secrecy on the STD epidemic). 
 55. In California alone, approximately 1.2 million cases of STDs occur 
each year, approximately 250,000 of which occur among teenagers. DIV. OF 
COMMUNICABLE DISEASE CONTROL, CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS., COMMUNI-
CABLE DISEASE CONTROL IN CALIFORNIA 17 (2000), available at http://www 
.dhs.ca.gov/ps/dcdc/pdf/CDC2000_Document.pdf. In a University of Washing-
ton study of university students, cervical infection was eight times greater 
than all other STD infections combined. UNIV. WASH. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
SERVS., EMERGING SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES (1998), available at 
http://depts.washington.edu/eminf/1998/std/std1.htm (citing studies led by Dr. 
Laura Koutsky at the University of Washington). Yet, only one in five teens 
says that they think they are at risk of getting an STD. ASHA—WHAT COST?, 
supra note 2, at 10. Perhaps for this reason, most single men and women (two-
thirds) say that they do not consistently use condoms. Id. 
 56. ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra note 2, at 8 (stating that about two-thirds 
of all new STD cases occur in people ages fifteen through twenty-four); Diane 
R. Blake, Adolescent Sexually Transmitted Diseases: Recent Developments, 
CURRENT INFECTIOUS DISEASE REP., April 2004, at 141, 141. 
 57. ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra note 2, at 8. 
 58. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC HIV/AIDS FACT 
SHEET: HIV/AIDS AMONG YOUTH 1–3 (2006). Among American youth, minori-
ties have been hit particularly hard by HIV/AIDS, with young blacks repre-
senting sixty-five percent of AIDS cases reported among thirteen- through 
nineteen-year-olds in 2002; Latino teens represented twenty percent. CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE IN ADO-
LESCENTS, L265 Slide Series (2002). 
 59. Teen Sex Fact Sheet, supra note 20. About fifty percent of all new HIV 
cases are found in people under age twenty-five. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, HIV PREVENTION STRATEGIC PLAN THROUGH 2005, at 18 
(January 2001), available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/prev-strat-plan.pdf. 
AIDS is also the third leading cause of death for African Americans ages 
twenty-five through fifty-four, and was the leading cause of death of African 
American women ages twenty-five through thirty-four in 2002. See Robert N. 
Anderson & Betty L. Smith, Deaths: Leading Causes for 2002, NAT’L VITAL 
STAT. REP. 67–70 (Mar. 7, 2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ 
nvsr/nvsr53/nvsr53_17.pdf. 
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or about one every ten seconds.60 At least two-thirds of people 
who acquire STDs in the United States are younger than 
twenty-five; at least one quarter are teenagers,61 and it appears 
that the percentage of young people afflicted is rising.62 Teen-
age girls have the highest rate of chlamydia,63 a common cause 
of PID, which can lead to infertility; at least ten percent of 
sexually active teens are infected with this disease.64 
There are a number of reasons why teenagers and young 
adults are at the greatest risk for acquiring an STD: they may 
have less immunity than adults; they are more likely to have 
multiple sex partners and to select partners who are high-risk; 
they are more likely to engage in unprotected sex; and the age 
of first sexual activity has decreased while the age at first mar-
riage has increased, resulting in more non-marital, non-
monogamous sexual activity.65 In sum, American teens and 
young adults are becoming sexually active at a younger age 
than prior generations, and they have more sexual partners.66 
 
 60. MEG MEEKER, EPIDEMIC: HOW TEEN SEX IS KILLING OUR KIDS 12 
(2002). 
 61. ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra note 2, at 8; TIP OF THE ICEBERG, supra 
note 17, at 3. 
 62. Teenagers are more sexually active today than in prior generations 
and sexual disease is quickly proliferating. See THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra 
note 1, at 36–37. 
 63. CDC—TRENDS, supra note 17, at 9. The ectropion of the cervix of a 
female teenager is physically more vulnerable to infection than that of a 
woman in her twenties. Jean R. Anderson & Michelle D. Wilson, Caring for 
Teenagers with Salpingitis, CONTEMP. OB/GYN, August 1990, at 103, 103. 
One result is that sexually active fifteen-year-olds have a one in eight chance 
of developing PID, but by age twenty-four, that probability decreases to one in 
eighty. Jia Kani & Michael W. Adler, Epidemiology of Pelvic Inflammatory 
Disease, in PELVIC INFLAMMATORY DISEASE 7, 9 (1992). 
 64. L. Weström, Incidence, Prevalence, and Trends of Acute Pelvic In-
flammatory Disease and Its Consequences in Industrialized Countries, 138 AM. 
J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 880, 885–87 (1980). 
 65. THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra note 1, at 69–108. Alcohol and other 
substance abuse are known to be associated with high-risk sexual behavior 
that leads to STDs, both generally and among youth. Id. at 76–79. 
 66. Teens and young adults around the world are having sex at a younger 
age than previous generations, and are having sex more frequently and with 
more partners. 2005 DUREX GLOBAL SEX SURVEY, http://www.durex.com/ 
gss (last visited Oct. 15, 2006). More than three hundred thousand sexually 
active and non-sexually active teenagers and adults across forty-one countries 
were studied. See id. The United States and Canada have among the lowest 
average ages of first intercourse, at about seventeen years of age—and the age 
of a young person’s first sexual experience is declining at an alarming rate. Id. 
Overall, people have sex 103 times per year, and globally the average number 
of partners is 9, whereas in the United States, the average number of partners 
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Indeed, the United States and Canada currently have among 
the youngest ages of first sexual experience, at 16.9 and 17 
years, and one study has found that twenty-five percent of sixth 
graders, thirty-three percent of seventh graders, and half of 
eighth graders have had sexual intercourse.67 Thus, despite the 
publicity surrounding a current “abstinence movement” among 
American youth, research shows a dramatic increase in adoles-
cent sexual activity in the last few decades, and early sexual 
activity is clearly linked to a greater number of sexual partners 
and a greater risk of acquiring a sexually transmitted disease.68 
B. THE ENORMOUS HEALTH CARE COSTS OF SEXUALLY 
TRANSMITTED DISEASES 
The most recent estimates of the costs of STDs in the 
United States are astounding and underscore the need for im-
mediate changes in education, public policy, and law. Experts 
 
is 10.7. In 1993, the World Bank estimated that STDs excluding AIDS are the 
second leading cause of healthy life lost among women ages fifteen to forty-
four in developing countries. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
1993, at 223. Only eleven percent of teens get most of their sex education from 
parents or family; most learn through peers whose information is largely inac-
curate. THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra note 1, at 90. Clearly, sexual disease 
education is desperately needed to help curb the sexual disease rate among 
American youths. See id. at 86–107. The so called “abstinence only” sex educa-
tion method is counterproductive and exacerbating the sexual disease prob-
lem, because it fails to educate youth about birth control and protection from 
disease. See id.  
 67. 2005 DUREX GLOBAL SEX SURVEY, supra note 66; INST. OF MED., su-
pra note 8, at 13. 
 68. The percentage of American high school students who have had sex 
decreased 7.4% from 1991 to 2003, from 54.1% to 46.7%. Ctrs. for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention, Surveillance Summaries, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WKLY. REP., May 21, 2004 at 29, 29 available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/ 
PDF/SS/SS5302.pdf. About sixty percent of high school seniors have had sex. 
Teen Sex Fact Sheet, supra note 20. This source also states that seventy-seven 
percent of nineteen-year-old females and eighty-five percent of nineteen-year-
old males have had sex. Id. (citing URBAN INST., NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADO-
LESCENT MALES, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHILD HEALTH AND HUMAN DEVEL-
OPMENT (1995)); CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY 
GROWTH (1995); see also ASPEN EDUC. GROUP, SEXUAL PROMISCUITY IN ADO-
LESCENTS, http://www.aspeneducation.com/factsheetpromiscuity.html (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2006) (stating that 66.4% of twelfth-graders have had sex). By 
age nineteen, more than half of Americans have had sex, with some sources 
reporting that nearly twenty percent of fifteen-year-olds, sixty percent of 
twelfth graders, and eighty percent of nineteen-year-olds have had sex. ASPEN 
EDUC. GROUP, supra. Ignorance among teens and young adults probably con-
tributes significantly to the STD rate among this group. Approximately four 
million teens contract an STD every year. ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra note 2, 
at 4, 8. 
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estimate that the medical costs alone associated with sexual 
disease in the United States already exceed sixteen billion dol-
lars per year and are growing rapidly.69 In 2004, researchers 
with the Alan Guttmacher Institute estimated that the direct 
costs of STDs, including HIV, among all age groups was be-
tween $9.3 and $15 billion in the United States in the mid 
1990s, adjusted to year 2000 dollars.70 This figure includes only 
the eight major STDs—HIV, HPV, HSV-2, hepatitis B, chlamy-
dia, gonorrhea, trichomoniasis, and syphilis71—and since indi-
rect and intangible costs were not included, the total costs are 
probably substantially higher.72 In 1997, some research indi-
cated that the annual cost was closer to seventeen billion dol-
lars.73 Texas and New York each have costs of over six hundred 
million dollars per year, while California’s total yearly costs are 
over one billion dollars.74 
About nine million young Americans ages fifteen to twenty-
four contract an STD every year, with a total estimated burden 
of $6.5 billion.75 Viral STDs, such as HIV, HSV-2, and HPV ac-
counted for ninety-four percent of the total burden ($6.2 bil-
lion), while nonviral/bacterial STDs accounted for only six per-
cent of the burden ($400 million).76 HIV and HPV were by far 
the most costly STDs in terms of total estimated direct medical 
costs, accounting for ninety percent of the total burden, or $5.9 
 
 69. TIP OF THE ICEBERG, supra note 17, at 3 (estimating the cost of STDs 
at seventeen billion dollars annually); Harrel W. Chesson et al., The Estimated 
Direct Medical Cost of Sexually Transmitted Diseases Among American Youth, 
2000, 36 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 11, 11 (2004) (estimating the 
direct costs of STDs to be between $9.3 and $15 billion in year 2000 dollars). 
 70. Chesson et al., supra note 69, at 11. Costs refer to direct medical and 
non-medical costs of treating STDs. Id. Direct medical costs include costs in-
volved with treating acute STDs and the sequelae of untreated or inade-
quately treated STDs, such as clinician visits, hospitalization, diagnostic test-
ing, and drug therapy. Id. Direct nonmedical costs include cost of 
transportation to medical services. Id. These direct costs must be distin-
guished from indirect medical costs such as productivity losses, lost wages at-
tributable to STDs, and intangible costs such as human pain and suffering; 
indirect medical costs are not included in these estimates. Id. These costs 
would obviously be higher if expressed in current U.S. dollars. Id. 
 71. Id. (excluding hepatitis C and bacterial vaginosis). 
 72. Id. 
 73. TIP OF THE ICEBERG, supra note 17, at 3 (estimating that seven billion 
dollars in costs results from HIV/AIDS annually and another ten billion dol-
lars per year results from other STDs). 
 74. ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra note 2, at 26 tbl.5. 
 75. Chesson et al., supra note 69, at 11, 15. 
 76. Id. 
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billion.77 Young people thus represent the class creating the 
most substantial economic burden in America relating to sexu-
ally transmitted diseases. Americans as a whole are paying the 
price through the cost-spreading function of insurance and gov-
ernment aid.78 These costs do not begin to include the enor-
mous emotional and mental health costs associated with early 
sexual activity and STD infection.79 
C. WHO IS SPREADING SEXUAL DISEASES? 
The number of sexually diseased persons in the United 
States could lead one to assume that these diseases are spread 
randomly throughout the population. However, researchers be-
lieve that this is not the case at all.80 A core group of sexually 
promiscuous people is responsible for the vast majority of new 
sexual disease cases; the vast majority of Americans never 
transmit a sexual disease to another person, even if they have 
one.81 
The most important datum relative to the transmission of 
a sexual infection is the number of other sexual partners the 
infected person’s partners have during an infectious period.82 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. In one study of patients receiving care for HIV, forty-seven percent 
were covered by Medicaid or Medicare, thirty-three percent had private insur-
ance, and twenty percent were uninsured. William E. Cunningham et al., 
Prevalence and Predictors of Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy Use in Pa-
tients with HIV Infection in the United States, 25 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFI-
CIENCY SYNDROMES 115, 118 (2000). 
 79. When compared to sexually inactive teens, sexually active teens are 
more likely to be depressed (3.3 times more likely for girls, 2.4 times more 
likely for boys) and to commit suicide (2.8 times more likely for girls and 8.6 
times more likely for boys). ROBERT E. RECTOR ET AL., THE HERITAGE FOUN-
DATION, CENTER FOR DATA ANALYSIS REPORT #CDA03-04, SEXUALLY ACTIVE 
TEENAGERS ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE DEPRESSED AND TO ATTEMPT SUICIDE 1–
5 (June 2, 2004), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/upload/ 
43062_1.pdf (relying on data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Ado-
lescent Health, Wave II, 1996, which is funded by the National Institute of 
Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) and seventeen other federal 
agencies). The researchers controlled for race, gender, exact age, and family 
income and found that there was virtually no impact on the statistics, mean-
ing that sexual activity appears to be the cause of the increased depression 
and attempted suicide, not confounding factors such as race or socioeconomic 
status. Id. at 5, 7–8. Not surprisingly, sixty-three percent of teens who had 
been sexually active expressed regret and wished that they had waited longer 
to have sex. Id. at 5 tbl.2. 
 80. Interview with Ed Laumann, supra note 15. 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id. 
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The most current available research indicates that over eighty 
percent of Americans ages eighteen to fifty-nine have zero or 
one sex partner in any given year, sixteen percent have be-
tween two and four partners, and only three percent have more 
than five sex partners.83 Age has a strong negative correlation 
with number of sex partners; younger persons have many more 
sex partners than older persons.84 Of course, the greater the 
number of sex partners, the greater the chance of acquiring a 
sexual disease; and, once a disease is contracted, the greater 
the number of subsequent sexual partners who are exposed.85 
Thus, within this core group of sexually active persons, the risk 
of infection rises not linearly as the number of partners rises, 
but exponentially.86 
People who have sex with people whom they have known 
for less than one month are four to five times more likely to 
contract a sexual disease.87 People who have concurrent (non-
monogamous) sexual partnering during some period of time 
create the greatest risk of spreading an infection if they con-
tract one. Research has found that of those persons who admit-
ted to having two partners in the past year, fifty-one percent 
had two or more partners concurrently during at least part of 
the past year.88 Of those who reported having three partners in 
the past year, sixty-one percent reported concurrent sexual re-
 
 83. LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 19, at 185. This is the most current com-
prehensive data on numbers of sex partners per year, and probably remains 
accurate for Americans over age twenty-eight, who were eighteen at the time 
of the studies. However, considering other evidence that persons under age 
twenty-five are generally much more promiscuous than prior generations, dis-
proportionately represent new cases of sexual disease, and were not included 
in this study, this data may not be accurate relative to this younger group of 
Americans. See, e.g., 2005 DUREX GLOBAL SEX SURVEY, supra note 66 (demon-
strating the marked differences in promiscuity between teenagers of the cur-
rent generation and teenagers of previous generations). This data nonetheless 
demonstrates that most Americans’ sexual practices remain monogamous and 
grossly divergent from that portrayed by television and other media forms. See 
THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC, supra note 1, at 86–107. 
 84. LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 19, at 185–86. To the extent that this re-
search is somewhat outdated, and considering the disease rate among young 
persons and the fact that young persons have always had more partners than 
older persons, it is logical to conclude that persons under age thirty are largely 
responsible for spreading sexual diseases and are frequently infecting others 
in the same age group. 
 85. Id. at 376–441. 
 86. Interview with Ed Laumann, supra note 15. 
 87. LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 19, at 408–09 tbl.11.15. 
 88. Id. at 183 tbl.5.2. 
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lationships, and of those who had six or more partners in the 
past year, eighty-five percent reported concurrent sexual rela-
tionships.89 For persons with two partners in the past year that 
were concurrent, the length of time during which the person 
had sexual relations with both averaged 2.5 months; for those 
who had six or more partners in the past year, the period dur-
ing which they had overlapping sexual relationships rose to 7.6 
months.90 Of the persons who admit to having had three or 
more partners in the past twelve months, thirty percent stated 
that their partners also had three or more partners during the 
same period.91 
Research further reveals that twenty-seven percent of men 
and forty-eight percent of women who report having had more 
than ten partners since age eighteen contract at least one STD, 
and thirty-seven percent of men and fifty-five percent of women 
who report having had twenty-one or more partners since age 
eighteen contract at least one STD.92 Since about three percent 
of persons report having more than five partners in the same 
year,93 young persons who have not yet married have the 
greatest number of partners,94 and younger persons have more 
partners than similarly situated persons in prior generations,95 
it becomes clear that a small fraction of the American public is 
responsible for the continued reproduction of several highly in-
fectious STDs, meaning that these people spread the infection 
to at least one other person before they are no longer infec-
tious.96 Other research has shown that persons with viral STDs 
have at least as many sexual partners, if not more, than per-
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 404. 
 92. Id. at 387 tbl.11.6. The type of disease also plays a role in the ease of 
transmission. For example, bacterial infections are transmissible following a 
short incubation period and are no longer communicable after treatment. Peo-
ple with bacterial infections such as chlamydia and gonorrhea are usually in-
fectious for about a month if they have symptoms, and about four months if 
they are asymptomatic. Id. at 424. Bacterial infections are generally the most 
highly transmissible STDs. Id. Viral STDs cannot be cured, and persons in-
fected with these STDs can be infected for years rather than months after be-
ing exposed. For example, AIDS can be transmitted continuously by the in-
fected person, while genital herpes and warts are intermittently transmissible, 
usually during outbreaks or other symptoms of the disease. Id.  
 93. Id. at 184. 
 94. Id. at 178 tbl.5.1B, 208 tbl.5.9A. 
 95. Id. at 204 tbl.5.7. 
 96. Id. at 424–25 
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sons who have never been infected with an STD, and that per-
sons with viral STDs do not moderate their sexual contact with 
others in any appreciable way.97 In addition, persons with a 
history of both bacterial and viral infections report having sex 
more frequently (gauged as number of sex acts per week) than 
those who have never been infected.98 Finally, persons with 
prior viral infections, in particular the youngest group ages 
eighteen to twenty-nine, “use condoms during vaginal inter-
course far less often than [those with no prior STDs].”99 Thus, 
while the consistent use of condoms can control the transmis-
sion of a variety of STDs,100 some of the most sexually irrespon-
sible members of society are failing to use them.101 
Although core group members often transmit diseases to 
other core group members, they also connect with non-core 
group members, passing sexual diseases to the general pub-
lic.102 Due to the nature of infectious antigens’ need for new 
bodies to stay in circulation, if the three percent of Ameri-
cans103 who represent the core group were to stop transmitting 
 
 97. Id. at 425. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. (emphasis added). Note that the proportion of persons with 
HIV/AIDS studied was very small and was combined with persons infected 
with other viral STDs. It is possible that persons with HIV/AIDS behave dif-
ferently than those with other viral infections such as genital herpes, consider-
ing the gravity of harm imposed by HIV/AIDS. 
 100. Id. at 422 tbl.11.23. There have been a few studies about actual con-
dom use. Younger persons are much more likely to use condoms than older 
persons. Id. at 426 tbl.11.24B. Young persons demonstrate less trust that a 
sexual partner will not transmit a disease. The researchers asked whether re-
spondents agreed with the statement, “You don’t need to use a condom if you 
know your partner well.” Seventy-four percent of respondents ages eighteen to 
twenty-four disagreed, while fifty-nine percent overall disagreed. Id. at 430. 
Perhaps ironically, the persons who had had fewer sexual partners were less 
trusting that a partner would not give them a disease. Or, perhaps their level 
of caution was the reason that they had had fewer sex partners. Id. at 430–31. 
Persons who had never had an STD were more likely to use condoms than 
those who had been infected with a viral STD. Id. at 426 tbl.11.24B. 
 101. Among persons who have had sex with four or more other persons in 
the last year, condom use never exceeds 30.8% other than in one-night stand 
situations, in which condom use rises to between 59% and 63%. Id. at 418–21, 
tbls.11.21–.22. This category includes persons who have sex with twenty, 
thirty, or even more partners per year—that is, the riskiest group of individu-
als. 
 102. Id. at 184, 424. However, since the non-core group members usually 
are not engaged in concurrent sexual relationships, they rarely transmit the 
disease to any other person. Id. at 424. 
 103. This three percent of Americans includes a larger percent of persons 
under age twenty-five, and a much smaller percent of persons over age forty-
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diseases, all sexually transmitted diseases would die out when 
all infected persons died; thus, some epidemiologists believe 
that three percent of Americans may be responsible for one 
hundred percent of sexual disease perpetration.104 Even if these 
figures are not exact, there is no question that a small, core 
group of Americans is responsible for the vast majority of new 
STD cases in the United States. 
Effective policies to slow the spread of sexual disease must 
focus on how to educate and deter this core group. The best le-
gal policy would consider how liability rules impact sexual 
choices, particularly among American youth, to discourage so-
cially destructive sexual behavior and to expose and create 
healthier sexual norms. Considering the tight social networks 
within which core group members circulate, and the fact that 
even minor modifications to core group members’ sexual prac-
tices (e.g., consistent condom usage) would seriously reduce the 
risk of most disease transmission, it seems fair to conclude that 
a small number court of judgments—word of which would 
spread rapidly—could have a big effect on the overall rate of 
sexual disease transmission. 
II.  HISTORICAL AND CURRENT SEX TORT 
JURISPRUDENCE   
“The history of man indicates that as soon as he created the re-
lationship of marriage, adultery was not far behind.”105 
 
This Part will first briefly review the history of American 
law and sexuality and posit that tort law’s fairly recent retreat 
from regulating sexual misconduct has fostered irresponsible 
sexual behavior, contributing to the current sexual disease epi-
demic. Next, this Part will review current sex tort law and ar-
gue that the current law is failing to meet its goals of deter-
rence, compensation, and protection of individuals’ health. 
 
five, who are generally married and so presumably “exit” the sexual market. 
Interview with Ed Laumann, supra note 15. 
 104. Id. Professor Laumann disputes this conclusion, which is based on 
mathematical models which assume pure random mixing. Id. 
 105. Daniel E. Murray, Ancient Laws on Adultery—A Synopsis, 1 J. FAM. L. 
89, 89 (1961). 
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A. SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 
“Amatory torts . . . have been abolished. . . . ‘The derisive term 
“heartbalm” attached to the breach of promise action is an indi-
cation that public policy no longer considers money damages 
appropriate for what is perceived as only an ordinary broken 
heart.’”106 
 
Regulation of sexual conduct can be traced to ancient law 
and has been a constant throughout history. Most of the an-
cient laws relating to sexual impropriety dealt with adultery.107 
Most U.S. states still have criminal statutes on the books pro-
viding for punishment of adultery, but criminal prosecutions 
are virtually non-existent.108 
Historically, the American tort system has actively de-
terred socially undesirable sexual conduct other than adultery. 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, actions for seduc-
tion were among the most common forms of civil actions, and 
were usually successful.109 Prior to the 1930s, U.S. courts en-
tertained actions for alienation of affections,110 criminal conver-
 
 106. Conley v. Romeri, 806 N.E.2d 933, 938 n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) 
(quoting Jeffrey D. Kobar, Note, Heartbalm Statutes and Deceit Actions, 83 
MICH. L. REV. 1770, 1778 (1985)). 
 107. Ancient punishment for adultery included being eaten alive by dogs, 
death of both parties, bodily mutilation of the adulterer, and, in ancient Rome, 
giving both the husband and the father the “right” to kill the guilty parties. 
See William R. Corbett, A Somewhat Modest Proposal to Prevent Adultery and 
Save Families: Two Old Torts Looking for a New Career, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 985, 
1002–03 (2001); Jill Jones, Comment, Fanning an Old Flame: Alienation of 
Affections and Criminal Conversation Revisited, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 61, 64–65 & 
nn.29–33 (1998). English common law considered adultery to be a tort, not a 
crime, and “allowed the husband of an adulterous wife to sue his wife’s lover 
for money damages in a criminal conversation action.” See Jones, supra, at 65. 
Early American Puritans forced adulterers to wear a scarlet “A” in lieu of 
death as punishment for adultery. See id. at 65 n.37. 
 108. See Jones, supra note 107, at 65–66. However, criminal seduction con-
victions relating to minors have been recorded as recently as 1988. See People 
v. Bayless, No. C043952, 2004 WL 2341477, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (noting 
that the defendant had been convicted of seduction of a minor in 1988). Am-
burgey v. Commonwealth, 415 S.W.2d 103, 104 (Ky. 1967) (emphasizing that 
the seduction victim was under age twenty-one); Dan Subotnik, “Sue Me, Sue 
Me, What Can You Do to Me? I Love You”: A Disquisition on Law, Sex, and 
Talk, 47 FLA. L. REV. 311, 324 n.58 (1995). 
 109. Jane E. Larson, “Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good 
Nature ‘Deceit’”: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 
383–84 (1993). 
 110. See Jones, supra note 107, at 66–67. Alienation of affections occurred 
when a third party’s interference destroyed the affection that existed between 
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sation,111 seduction,112 and breach of marriage promise.113 What 
bound these four “heartbalm” torts together was their common 
focus on legal redress for emotional and reputational injury re-
sulting from sexual misconduct; disease control was not a fac-
tor.114 
During the latter half of the twentieth century, heartbalm 
torts were eviscerated, essentially on the ground that public 
policy does not support civil redress for broken hearts, and that 
women who brought heartbalm actions were abusing men 
through the civil court system. Early feminists who sought 
freedom from paternalistic laws and obsolete common law con-
ceptions of women as property of men115 fueled the first anti-
heartbalm movement as part of the first American sex revolu-
tion that began in the 1930s.116 Indiana’s enactment of the Act 
 
spouses prior to the interference. Id. at 68–69. This tort was known as “en-
ticement” in English common law, and could be brought against any meddling 
third party, even without sexual involvement, such as mothers-in-law. Id. at 
66, 68–69. Some scholars assert that alienation of affections did not evolve 
from enticement. Id. at 67. 
 111. Id. at 66–68. This tort involved a third party’s adulterous relationship 
with a plaintiff ’s spouse. It was a strict liability tort, as there were no real de-
fenses. Id. Defendants were liable even if the adulterous spouse lived apart 
from the plaintiff and represented herself to be unmarried. Id. This tort was 
known as “seduction” in English common law. Id. 
 112. Seduction went through some changes in American law, and this tort 
was codified in many states beginning in Iowa in 1851, and allowed women to 
sue in their own name for damages resulting from the devastating social in-
jury that resulted at that time from premarital sex or unwed motherhood. See 
Larson, supra note 109, at 385–86. 
 113. Id. at 394 & n.85. 
 114. Id. 
 115. All of these torts originated from the concept that women were prop-
erty, which is why fathers and husbands had the right to sue the men who 
took sexual advantage of their daughters or wives, as this constituted an inter-
ference with their property rights and loss of the woman’s services to the 
plaintiff. See id. at 382–83; see also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 875 
(4th ed. 1971) (explaining that a wife’s consent did not destroy the husband’s 
criminal conversation action, since the wife was considered property: “it was 
considered that [the wife] was no more capable of giving consent which would 
prejudice the husband’s interest than would his horse” (citing 8 HOLDSWORTH, 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 430 (2d ed. 1937))). 
 116. See, e.g., Subotnik, supra note 108, at 320–21. Ironically, the argu-
ments that fueled the movement to abandon heartbalm torts were hardly con-
sistent with the view that women were independent, competent people who 
did not need the law’s protection. Instead, the main arguments in support of 
the anti-heartbalm movement centered on women’s alleged misuse of the torts 
to extort money from men, with newspaper articles calling plaintiffs in these 
cases “golddiggers” and “blackmailers” who used the heartbalm torts as tools 
for extortion. Larson, supra note 109, at 394–96. 
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To Promote Public Morals initiated the movement, abolishing 
all of the state’s heartbalm torts.117 Other states quickly pro-
posed similar legislation, and much of the rhetoric surrounding 
the new legislation was misogynistic, focusing on the “golddig-
gers” who blackmailed money from men through sex tort vehi-
cles.118 Nonetheless, even though twenty-three states consid-
ered anti-heartbalm legislation in 1935, only eight states had 
passed such legislation by 1950.119 
A second wave of anti-heartbalm legislation emerged with 
the second American sexual revolution of the 1960s.120 This pe-
riod, of course, involved a sweeping rejection of traditional 
American values. Traditional beliefs about sexual morality and 
gender roles were abandoned, as more women moved from the 
home into the workforce and, perhaps above all, women gained 
substantial control over their reproductive function with the 
birth control pill.121 No doubt spurred in part by the release of 
the Kinsey reports122 and the popularization of pornography 
 
 117. See 1935 Ind. Acts 1009 (codified at IND. CODE. ANN. § 2-508 (Lex-
isNexis 1945)); Corbett, supra note 107, at 1007–08. 
 118. See Corbett, supra note 107, at 1007–10; Larson, supra note 109, at 
394–400, 445–48. 
 119. See Corbett, supra note 107, at 1008 nn.100–03. 
 120. Although most people think of the American sexual revolution as a 
1960s phenomenon, from a sociological and legislative standpoint, it is really 
the second wave of a sexual revolution that began in the 1930s when Victorian 
concepts were rejected by early feminists, and female power and sexual ex-
pression became more socially acceptable. In addition, the 1960s sexual revo-
lution probably began no later than 1953, when Kinsey’s second report and 
Playboy magazine came out, as these items caused people to reassess sexual 
norms. See infra notes 122–23. 
 121. At least some scholars believe that this control over childbirth ushered 
in an “era of liberated sexual practices, where openness and sexual freedom 
would reign.” EDWARD A. WYNNE & KEVIN RYAN, RECLAIMING OUR SCHOOLS: 
TEACHING CHARACTER, ACADEMICS, AND DISCIPLINE 225–26 (2d ed. 1997). 
 122. In 1948 and 1953, respectively, Alfred Kinsey and his colleagues pub-
lished the first “scientific” data regarding male and female promiscuity. See 
ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 3 (1948) 
[hereinafter KINSEY, MALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR]; ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., 
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 3 (1953) [hereinafter KINSEY, FE-
MALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR]. Despite methodological flaws, the most serious of 
which related to the unrepresentative sexual nature of the subjects of the 
study, who were recruited from “[a] fraternity here, a college class there, a 
PTA from a third place, and a group of homosexual men from somewhere else,” 
the Kinsey reports were widely read, “shocked the nation and became en-
shrined as the nation’s report card on sexual behavior.” ROBERT T. MICHAEL 
ET AL., SEX IN AMERICA 15–20 (1994). The reports stated, inter alia, that 
ninety percent of men and fifty percent of women had premarital sex, that al-
most all men and sixty percent of women masturbated, and that fifty percent 
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through publications such as Playboy,123 sex came out of the 
closet and into the streets, and consensual sex outside of mar-
riage, masturbation, cohabitation, birth control, and even abor-
tion became more accepted.124 The only practical consequences 
of adultery or other irresponsible or deceptive sexual behavior 
were a lover’s contempt, and possibly a relatively benign, cur-
able sexual disease.125 
 
of men had extramarital sex. KINSEY, MALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, supra at 502, 
551, 585; KINSEY, FEMALE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR, supra at 151, 286. This news 
disturbed Americans and may have contributed to the increased sexuality of 
Americans thereafter. MICHAEL ET AL., supra, at 20. Indeed, Kinsey is re-
ported to have encouraged pedophiles to sexually violate “from 317 to 2035 in-
fants and children,” to have been involved in a variety of perverse sexual prac-
tices, and ultimately, to have died as a result of “orchitis,” a lethal infection of 
the testicles that results from masochistic masturbation. Judith A. Reisman, 
Crafting Bi/Homosexual Youth, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 283, 312 (2002). 
Kinsey’s inaccurate data, and the resultant societal reaction, may have con-
tributed greatly to the rise of sexual disease in America, as behavioral re-
search shows that people’s perceptions of what others are doing impacts their 
own choices and can alter norms. See infra Part III.B.2. What is clear is that 
prior to Kinsey’s publications, the only common sexually transmitted diseases 
were gonorrhea and syphilis—both bacterial, and both easily treatable with 
antibiotics. But now, the sexual disease epidemic involves so many incurable, 
viral antigens that scientists cannot even count them accurately. See supra 
Part I.A. 
 123. The first edition of Playboy came out in December of 1953, the same 
year Kinsey’s second report was released. Playboy FAQ, http://www.playboy 
.com/worldofplayboy/faq/firstissue.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2006). Seventy 
thousand copies of the first Playboy edition were printed and over 54,000 were 
sold, at fifty cents per copy, no doubt in large part because Marilyn Monroe 
was the centerfold. Id.; see What Makes Marilyn?, PLAYBOY, Dec. 1953, at 17, 
19. On the first issue’s first page, Hugh Hefner wrote, “[w]e believe too, that 
we are filling a publishing need only slightly less important than the one just 
taken care of by the Kinsey Report.” Volume 1, Number 1, PLAYBOY, Dec. 
1953, at 1, 1. There was no date on the original issue of Playboy, as Hefner did 
not know if the magazine would sell, and whether a second edition would be 
financially feasible. Playboy FAQ, supra. For the same reason, Hefner’s name 
does not appear on the first edition, for fear that if it failed, he’d have trouble 
getting another publishing job. Id. 
 124. Anita L. Allen, Privacy and the Public Official: Talking About Sex as a 
Dilemma for Democracy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1176 (1999).  
 125. In 1950, the only common sexual diseases were gonorrhea and syphi-
lis, which were bacterial and curable. See supra Part I.A. Divorce law under-
went radical changes as the “no fault” divorce trend, beginning in Washington 
State in 1973, spread quickly, removing economic consequences for adultery 
leading to divorce. See HARRY D. KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW 2 (5th ed. 2003). 
Prior to no-fault divorce, adultery was grounds for divorce and often dimin-
ished substantially the adulterer’s property rights in the divorce settlement. 
See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: 
State Courts React to Troxel, 35 FAM. L.Q. 577, 611–12 (2002). However, a few 
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During the sexual revolution of the 1960s, feminist sex re-
formers sought to advance women’s rights by reshaping the 
law’s regulation of sex,126 and a new wave of the anti-heartbalm 
movement ensued. This time, reforms were very successful.127 
Today, no more than nine states recognize alienation of affec-
tions or criminal conversation.128 Seduction has been abolished 
by statute in all but seventeen states, and twenty-one states 
have interpreted their anti-heartbalm statutes to prohibit 
breach of promise actions.129 
Judicial sentiment surrounding the second wave of the 
anti-heartbalm movement revealed the sexual revolution’s ap-
parent impact on American norms. Courts expressed the view 
that the heartbalm torts “diminished human dignity” by airing 
such matters in the courts, and that the prevalence (and ap-
parent societal acceptance) of extramarital affairs could clog 
the court system with vexatious litigation if such torts were al-
lowed.130 In turn, these reforms conveyed a message to society 
that the law was not concerned about sexual misconduct,131 in-
 
states continue to bar alimony altogether when the claimant spouse is found 
guilty of adultery causing divorce. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-1 (2004). 
 126. As part of this movement, rape laws were also changed to protect 
women. For example, laws eliminated the marital exception to rape and pro-
hibited sexual harassment. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 109, at 400–01. 
 127. See Corbett, supra note 107, at 1009–10. 
 128. Id. at 1009. 
 129. See Subotnik, supra note 108, at 321–22. 
 130. See Feldman v. Feldman, 480 A.2d 34, 36 (N.H. 1984); Jones, supra 
note 107, at 72–73; see also Norton v. MacFarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 12 (Utah 1991) 
(stating that allegations of sexual misconduct no longer carry a significant 
stigma). 
 131. At least one legal scholar has argued that Lorena Bobbit’s self-help 
decision to remove her husband’s penis while he slept resulted in part from a 
lack of legal remedies. See Gretchen Reynolds, A Breach of Promise, CHI. 
MAG., Apr. 1994, at 114, 114. In 1997, a North Carolina jury ordered a hus-
band’s adulterous lover to pay his wife one million dollars after deciding that 
the lover lured him away from his wife and family. See Hutelmyer v. Cox, 514 
S.E.2d 554 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999); Terry Carter, “She Done Me Wrong”: A Jury 
Agrees, Awarding a Jilted Wife $1 Million in an Alienation of Affection Suit 
Against the “Other Woman,” A.B.A. J., Oct. 1997, at 24. In an interview with 
Dateline NBC, jurors stated that they wanted to send a message about mar-
riage and morality and to make clear that “homewreckers” were wrong. Date-
line NBC: Three’s Company; Woman Accused of Breaking up Marriage Sued by 
Ex-Wife (NBC television broadcast Dec. 15, 1997). The show described the case 
pursued by Dorothy Hutelmyer against her husband’s secretary as a “symbol 
for the prevailing thoughts about relationships and marriage in this area.” Id. 
The secretary-defendant later stated that, in retrospect, she would not have 
dated Joe Hutelmyer under the circumstances, and would have waited until 
he was divorced before seducing him. Id. This contention is contrary to one 
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cluding adultery,132 in part because sex tort law was focused on 
broken hearts and injury to dignity, not deadly diseases. The 
absence of legal sanctions for sexual misconduct,133 and result-
ing contemporary belief among some Americans that they owe 
nothing to their sexual partners, fail to discourage sexual 
promiscuity,134 and contribute to the sexual disease epidemic. 
Tort law’s current message to society regarding sexuality is 
clearly “caveat emptor.”135 
B. SEX TORTS TODAY 
“[P]laintiff ’s claim clearly is barred . . . . The very illegal act to 
which the plaintiff consented [premarital sex] . . . produced the 
injuries and damages of which she complains [genital herpes]. 
And, the foregoing principle [illegal acts bar recovery in tort] 
applies even though defendant concealed his infection from the 
plaintiff.”136 
 
The sexual disease epidemic necessitates a reassessment of 
tort law’s proper function in sexual relations, as a new wave of 
sex tort litigation—seeking damages for sexual disease trans-
mission—has been growing over the past twenty years and will 
likely continue to grow commensurate with the proliferation of 
 
court’s opinion that in matters of sex, the risk of damages is not a deterrent. 
See Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho 1994). 
 132. A high percentage of Americans say that adultery is wrong, and in fact 
more Americans say so today than in the 1970s (around 85%), yet when asked 
if they thought less of a person who they knew had committed adultery, only 
about 60% said they lost esteem for that person. Bruce Handy, How We Really 
Feel About Fidelity, TIME, Aug. 31, 1998 at 52, 52–53. In a 1998 CNN/Time 
poll, 86% of Americans responded that adultery was wrong, compared with 
76% in 1977. CNN.com, Allpolitics, How Do Americans View Adultery? (Aug. 
20, 1998), http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/08/20/adultery.poll. 
 133. This has led one legal commentator to conclude, “The current lack of 
penalties for adultery and interference with family relationships is shockingly 
new.” See Jones, supra note 107, at 64. 
 134. “Promiscuity” does not carry a moral connotation but means “indis-
criminate” or “not restricted to one sexual partner.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 994 (11th ed. 2003). 
 135. See Larson, supra note 109, at 413 (“Ironically, the principle of caveat 
emptor remains most vigorously alive in the sexual marketplace.”). 
 136. Zysk v. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d 721, 722 (Va. 1990). This case was essentially 
overruled by the Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
558–78 (2003), which held a Texas statute banning same-sex sodomy between 
consenting adults unconstitutional. Id.; Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 370 
(Va. 2005) (holding that the personal liberty rights guaranteed by Lawrence 
extend to premarital sex). 
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sexual disease. Although a few states have recognized negligent 
transmission of sexual disease since the late nineteenth or 
early twentieth century,137 courts all over the United States are 
addressing as an issue of first impression the question of 
whether civil liability is appropriate for sexual disease trans-
mission.138 Courts are grappling for liability standards in sex 
 
 137. Tort recovery for the negligent transmission of a contagious disease, 
such as whooping cough, has existed in the United States since the latter part 
of the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Smith v. Baker, 20 F. 709, 709–10 
(S.D.N.Y. 1884) (whooping cough); Gilbert v. Hoffman, 23 N.W. 632, 632, 634 
(Iowa 1885) (smallpox); Kowalske v. Armour & Co., 220 N.W.2d 268, 270–71, 
273–74 (Minn. 1974) (brucellosis); Skillings v. Allen, 173 N.W. 663, 664 (Minn. 
1919) (scarlet fever); Franklin v. Butcher, 129 S.W. 428, 428, 431 (Mo. 1910) 
(smallpox); Hendricks v. Butcher, 129 S.W. 431, 432–33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910) 
(smallpox); Earle v. Kuklo, 98 A.2d 107, 108–09 (N.J. Super. 1953) (tuberculo-
sis); Kliegel v. Aitken, 69 N.W. 67, 67, 69 (Wis. 1896) (typhoid fever). Trans-
mission of a sexual disease has constituted a crime in some states since the 
early twentieth century. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-519 (1991 & 
Supp. 2006) (originally enacted as OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 543 (1921)); 
State v. Lankford, 102 A. 63, 64 (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1917) (syphilis). Tort li-
ability has also been recognized for sexual disease transmission in some states 
since the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See, e.g., White v. Nel-
lis, 31 N.Y. 405, 405, 410 (1865) (venereal disease); Crowell v. Crowell, 105 
S.E. 206, 206, 208, 210 (N.C. 1920) (unspecified venereal disease); De Vall v. 
Strunk, 96 S.W.2d 245, 246–47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (crabs). However, disease 
has not been the focus of sex tort law until fairly recently, a result of the sex-
ual disease epidemic. See, e.g., Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So.2d 686, 687, 690 
(Ala. 1989) (genital herpes); Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564, 564, 568 (Cal. App. 
1990) (genital herpes); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 274, 277 
(Cal. App. 1984) (genital herpes); Cerniglia v. Levasseur, No. CV950548181, 
1995 WL 500673 at *1–2, *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 1995) (genital herpes 
to a third party); Long v. Adams, 333 S.E.2d 852, 853, 856 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) 
(genital herpes); Meany v. Meany, 639 So.2d 229, 230–31, 237 (La. 1994) 
(genital herpes); McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043, 1044, 1046–47 (Me. 
1998) (human papilloma virus); M.M.D. v. B.L.G., 467 N.W.2d 645, 646, 648 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (herpes); R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 105–06 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (herpes); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 652–53 (Mo. 
1986) (herpes); G.L. v. M.L., 550 A.2d 525, 526, 528 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1988) (geni-
tal herpes); Plaza v. Estate of Wisser, 626 N.Y.S.2d 446, 449, 545–55 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1995) (HIV); Schenk v. Devall, 613 N.Y.S.2d 478, 479–80 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1994) (herpes); Desideri v. Brown, 584 N.Y.S.2d 815, 815–16 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1992) (venereal disease); Maharam v. Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104, 105, 
108–09 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (herpes); Tischler v. Dimenna, 609 N.Y.S.2d 
1002, 1002–03, 1009–10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (AIDS); Doe v. Roe, 598 N.Y.S.2d 
678, 679–80 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 1993) (chlamydia); Mussivand v. David, 544 
N.E.2d 265, 265, 273–74 (Ohio 1989) (venereal disease); Lockhart v. Loosen, 
943 P.2d 1074, 1076–77, 1081–82 (Okla. 1997) (genital herpes); Duke v. 
Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 337–38, 353 (Wyo. 1979) (gonorrhea). 
 138. See, e.g., McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043, 1045 (Me. 1998) 
(“Turning to [plaintiff ’s] novel theory of negligence, we must first determine 
whether a negligence action may be based on the transmission of a sexually 
transmitted disease, an issue of first impression in Maine.”); B.N. v. K.K., 538 
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tort cases while holding tight to anti-heartbalm sentiment. This 
stance has resulted in sex tort jurisprudence that is unclear 
and unpredictable, thereby failing to meet tort law’s goals of 
deterrence, education, and compensation in light of a very seri-
ous public health threat.139 Although sexual disease cases are 
almost always brought as negligence actions, courts have also 
recognized sex torts grounded in fraud, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and battery where the plaintiff contracted a 
sexual disease.140 This Section argues that negligence and in-
tentional tort theories do not further social policy in sexual dis-
ease transmission cases. 
1. Negligence Theory 
“[P]ersons who engage in unprotected sex, at a time of the preva-
lence of sexually transmitted diseases, including some that are 
fatal, assume the risk of contracting such diseases. Both parties 
in an intimate relationship have a duty to adequately protect 
themselves. When one ventures out in the rain without an um-
brella, should they complain when they get wet?”141 
 
This quote expresses a typical judicial attitude toward sex-
ual disease transmission: while courts recognize the prevalence 
of the public health threat, their attitude toward persons fool-
ish enough to contract a sexual disease trumps solid public pol-
icy analysis. Opinions such as this shame the victim and allow 
sexual disease perpetrators to pay no regard to others’ health. 
Since this opinion was written in 1993, tens of millions of 
Americans have contracted sexual diseases.142 
 
A.2d 1175, 1176 (Md. Ct. App. 1988) (answering affirmatively the question 
from the District Court: “Does Maryland Recognize A Cause of Action for Ei-
ther Fraud, Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress, Or Negligence Re-
sulting From the Sexual Transmission Of A Dangerous, Contagious, and In-
curable Disease, Such As Genital Herpes?”). 
 139. Some states are still in the process of abolishing heartbalm torts. See, 
e.g., Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho 1994) (finding that Idaho no longer 
recognizes criminal conversation as a tort). 
 140. A few cases have also recognized negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress, but these usually involve fear of contracting AIDS and are generally 
analyzed consistent with toxic tort cases, focusing on fear of future disease. 
See, e.g., Tischler v. Dimenna, 609 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994). 
 141. Doe v. Roe, 598 N.Y.S.2d 678, 681 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 1993). 
 142. See supra Part I.A. 
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Sexual disease transmission cases rely almost exclusively 
on negligence theory,143 a fault-based tort which is unpredict-
able, inefficient, and often extremely embarrassing for the par-
ties involved in sex tort cases. Although all contemporary 
courts that have dealt with the issue have found that it is pos-
sible to state a claim for negligent transmission of a sexual dis-
ease, the current negligence paradigm creates prohibitively ex-
pensive and embarrassing fact-specific litigation and the 
attendant problem of very uncertain liability, thereby failing to 
deter irresponsible sexual conduct. Primarily, judges seem re-
luctant to establish a clear duty of care relative to sexual activ-
ity,144 instead adopting a case-by-case inquiry to determine 
whether a duty to protect a sexual partner from a sexual dis-
ease should exist.145 In addressing the question of duty, courts 
have focused on the nature of the parties’ relationship and 
whether the defendant knew or should have known of his dis-
ease, to establish the foreseeability of infecting others. A Cali-
fornia opinion exemplifies the case-by-case approach to the 
duty question: 
In determining whether a duty should be imposed, the courts are 
guided by the basic principle . . . that everyone is responsible for in-
jury occasioned to another by his own want of ordinary care or 
 
 143. See, e.g., Michele L. Mekel, Kiss and Tell: Making the Case for the Tor-
tious Transmission of Herpes and Human Papilloma Virus, 66 MO. L. REV. 
929, 938–39 (2001). Negligent conduct is conduct that creates an unreasonable 
risk of harm to a person to whom a duty of due care is owed, and is generally 
stated upon prima facie proof of four elements: duty, breach, harm, and causa-
tion. Id. 
 144. But see R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 106–08 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1988) (noting that persons with sexual diseases are in the best position to con-
trol the spread of the disease). 
 145. Although some courts have found that a duty to avoid infecting others 
always exists where the defendant knows of his disease, defendants often do 
not know, or claim that they do not know, resulting in courts finding no duty 
based on lack of foreseeability. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564, 566–67 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (“‘Ordinarily foreseeability is a question of fact.’” “‘The de-
gree of foreseeability necessary to warrant the finding of a duty will vary from 
case to case.’” (quoting Bigbee v. Pac. Tel. & Tel., 665 P.2d 947, 950 (Cal. 
1983); Isaacs v. Huntingon Mem. Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 658 (Cal. 1985))). 
Courts have similarly found a breach of the duty on the basis of varying de-
grees of careless actions. See, e.g., Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 689 (Ala. 
1989) (carelessly exposing others to infection); Doe, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 565, 567 
(failing to inform a sexual partner that defendant had herpes and failing to 
put on a condom); M.M.D. v. B.L.G., 467 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) 
(failing to obtain a diagnosis and treatment where defendant claims he was 
unaware of the infection but had recurring genital sores and had received 
medical advice that they may be herpes); Leary, supra note 2, at 176 n.17 (de-
scribing the imposition of liability for failure to abstain from sex). 
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skill. . . . [I]n cases where the burden of preventing future harm is 
great, a high degree of foreseeability may be required. On the other 
hand, in cases where there are strong policy reasons for preventing 
the harm, or the harm can be prevented by simple means, a lesser de-
gree of foreseeability may be required. . . . [In the case of herpes], it is 
beyond question that our state’s policy of preventing the spread of ve-
nereal disease is great and that the burden of warning a prospective 
sex partner is small. Thus, only a slight degree of foreseeability was 
needed to warrant the imposition of a duty of due care in the present 
case [of herpes transmission].146 
An Oklahoma decision is representative of the unpredict-
able nature of the duty inquiry: “The length and nature of the 
parties’ relationship, its degree of intimacy, and [defendant’s] 
knowledge of her condition are all factors to consider in order to 
determine whether [defendant’s] conduct created . . . a duty to 
lessen the risk or take precautions to protect others. . . .”147 
The unclear duty standard that has emerged in sexual dis-
ease cases148 has prompted defendants to make numerous ar-
 
 146. Doe, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 566–67; see also Cerniglia v. Levasseur, No. 
CV950548181, 1995 WL 500673, at *3–4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 1995) 
(holding that persons with a venereal disease have a duty to use reasonable 
care to avoid infecting others with whom they engage in sexual conduct); 
McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043, 1046 (Me. 1998) (finding that a de-
fendant cannot be liable for negligent transmission of the human papilloma 
virus to his wife where the trial court found that he did not know or have rea-
son to know that he had the disease at the time he infected his wife; and that, 
absent foreseeability, defendant cannot be found to have breached a duty of 
care); M.M.D., 467 N.W.2d at 647 (“A reasonable person with recurring sores 
on the genitals . . . has a duty to avoid sexual contact, or at least to inform po-
tential sex partners about the genital sores and [his] physician’s advice.”); 
R.A.P., 428 N.W.2d at 106–07 (“Minnesota courts have long recognized that 
the preservation of public health is a matter of great public importance. Legal 
duties and rules must therefore be designed, whenever possible, to help pre-
vent the spread of dangerous, communicable diseases.” (citing Skillings v. Al-
len, 173 N.W. 663, 664 (Minn. 1919))). 
 147. Smith v. Speligene, 990 P.2d 312, 315–16 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999). This 
case involved Herpes Simplex I, which plaintiff alleged he contracted from his 
former girlfriend. Id. at 315–16. The court utilized zone of risk analysis. See 
id. Although the case does not indicate which part of his body was infected, 
HSVI is usually related to oral herpes, but can be transmitted to other body 
parts and can be painful. All herpes viruses are incurable. K. Holmes et al., 
Sexually Transmissible Diseases (Venereal Infections), in CLINICAL CONCEPTS 
OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 232, 245–46 (Leighton E. Cluff & Joseph E. Johnson 
eds., 3d ed. 1982). 
 148. See, e.g., R.A.P., 428 N.W.2d at 108 (“The scope of the duty of care 
which we recognize here will necessarily vary depending upon the facts of in-
dividual cases. As one commentator has noted, the three words ‘I have herpes’ 
will be sufficient in most cases to give fair notice of the danger of infection, and 
to fulfill the duty to use reasonable care to avoid transmitting the disease. 
Whether the duty to take reasonable precaution to avoid transmission of her-
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guments asserting that no duty is owed to a sexual partner, in-
cluding: that no duty exists to disclose sexual disease to a sex-
ual partner prior to sex;149 that no duty exists to the spouse of a 
paramour;150 that no duty exists absent a confirmed diagnosis 
of the disease;151 that no duty exists to disclose extramarital 
sexual relations to one’s spouse absent knowledge of having 
contracted a disease;152 and that past promiscuous behavior 
within a group at high risk for contracting AIDS, without 
knowledge of having contracted AIDS, does not give rise to a 
duty to warn.153 These arguments have been entertained, and 
unclear legal standards have created opportunities for some of 
 
pes has been breached is a question of fact . . . .”); Mussivand v. David, 544 
N.E.2d 265, 269 (Ohio 1989) (“The general principle is well established that a 
person who negligently exposes another to an infectious or contagious disease, 
which such other thereby contracts, is liable in damages therefor. The degree 
of diligence required to prevent exposing another to a contagious or infectious 
disease depends upon the character of the disease and the danger of communi-
cating it to others.”). But c.f. Silver v. Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., 692 
N.Y.S.2d 886, 887–88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (holding that a wrestler owed an-
other wrestler a duty based on his knowledge of herpes blisters on his skin 
and the skin-to-skin contact inherent in wrestling). 
 149. See, e.g., R.A.P., 428 N.W.2d at 106; Smith v. Walker, 11 Pa. D. & C. 
4th 663, 664 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1991). 
 150. See, e.g., Cerniglia, 1995 WL 500673, at *4; Lockhart v. Loosen, 943 
P.2d 1074, 1077, 1080–81 (Okla. 1997). Both cases held that a paramour may 
be liable to the spouse of his or her sexual partner provided that it was fore-
seeable that the disease could be transmitted to the spouse (i.e., the paramour 
knows of the marriage, as sex between spouses was held foreseeable) and no 
superseding cause exists (i.e., the paramour’s sex partner was not informed of 
the disease at the time he or she gave it to his or her spouse; if the paramour’s 
sex partner was informed, the partner’s negligence or intentional misconduct 
in failing to inform the spouse constitutes a superseding cause). See Cerniglia, 
1995 WL 500673, at *4–5; Lockhart, 943 P.2d at 1079–81. 
 151. See, e.g., Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1387 (W.D. Mich. 1993). 
 152. See, e.g., McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043, 1044–46 (Me. 1998) 
(holding that no duty to be sexually faithful exists in a marriage); In re Mar-
riage of J.T., 891 P.2d 729, 732 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that no duty 
exists between spouses to disclose extramarital sexual relationships). But see 
S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 652–53 (Mo. 1986) (holding that courts can 
assess, define, and adjust the duty of care owed by one spouse to the other 
spouse). 
 153. See, e.g., Johnson, 817 F. Supp. at 1392–93. In Johnson, the court lim-
ited the duty to warn a sexual partner about the possibility of contracting 
AIDS only where the defendant: (1) has actual knowledge that he is HIV posi-
tive; (2) has experienced symptoms associated with HIV; or (3) has actual 
knowledge that a prior sex partner has been diagnosed as having HIV. Id. at 
1395. The court specifically held that there was no duty to warn the plaintiff 
that defendant was a member of a high-risk group, and that a defendant who 
has had unprotected sexual encounters with multiple partners does not have a 
legal duty to inform a plaintiff of his or her past sexual activity. Id. 
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these arguments to succeed.154 Indeed, although courts have re-
jected the claim that a husband owes his wife no duty to avoid 
transmitting herpes,155 a Washington court has held that there 
is no duty of sexual fidelity even in marital relationships (that 
is, the marriage relationship is not a “special relationship”),156 
and therefore there is no duty to disclose extramarital sexual 
relations, despite the clear health risks involved.157 Other 
courts more broadly define the duty to include protecting others 
from infection, which may involve more than merely admitting 
to having a disease.158 Most courts have found that a duty not 
to spread infection exists between sexual partners if the defen-
dant knew or should have known of his disease, regardless of 
 
 154. One court noted that a single admission, “I have herpes,” may be suffi-
cient notice to meet the duty of care. R.A.P., 428 N.W.2d at 108. Third party 
actions create even more fact-specific inquiries into the issue of whether duty 
exists. For example, in one case where a wife sued her husband’s lover for 
transmittal of genital herpes, the issue of whether the lover owed a duty to the 
wife became the subject of remand to determine: (1) whether the defendant 
knew or should have known that she had herpes, and had copulated with the 
wife’s husband while infectious; and (2) whether she knew he was married 
(making it foreseeable that her lover would in turn give the disease to his wife, 
as sexual relations between spouses are foreseeable). See Lockhart v. Loosen, 
943 P.2d 1074, 1077, 1079–81 (Okla. 1997). In addition, even in situations in 
which it is determined that the lover knew all of the above, if the adulterous 
spouse knew or should have known of the disease and passed it on to his 
spouse anyway, his negligence may supersede his lover’s, cutting off proximate 
cause based on “termination of the risk” concepts. See Mussivand v. David, 544 
N.E.2d. 265, 272–73 (1989). 
 155. See, e.g., Hamblen v. Davidson, 50 S.W.3d 433, 439 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2000). 
 156. In re Marriage of J.T., 891 P.2d at 730. A defendant’s relationship to 
the plaintiff has been held to create a duty of care in a number of circum-
stances, sometimes referred to as “special relationships,” and include a land-
owner’s duty to protect customers or tenants, a school’s duty to protect stu-
dents, an employer’s duty to protect employees who are endangered on the job, 
and a custodian’s duty to protect persons in custody, such as prisoners and in-
voluntarily committed mental patients. See DOBBS, supra note 4, at 875–91. 
 157. See In re Marriage of J.T., 891 P.2d at 730; see also McPherson v. 
McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043, 1045–46 (Me. 1998) (rejecting a wife’s argument 
that her husband owed her a duty of sexual fidelity based on the marital rela-
tionship and that a “breach of that duty is actionable when it leads to physical 
harm,” and instead relying on the more general concept that “one who knows 
or should know that he or she is infected with a sexually transmitted disease 
is under a duty to protect sexual partners from infection”). 
 158. See, e.g., McPherson, 712 A.2d at 1046; Milbank Ins. Co. v. B.L.G., 484 
N.W.2d 52, 57 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (“A person who knows he has herpes has 
‘a duty to use reasonable care to avoid infecting others.’” (quoting R.A.P., 428 
N.W.2d at 107)), called into doubt on other grounds by Am. Family Ins. Co. v. 
Walser, 628 N.W.2d 605, 610 (Minn. 2001). 
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marriage,159 or that the intimate nature of the sexual relation-
ship created a “special relationship,” and attendant duty of 
care.160 
Published decisions have focused on whether the defendant 
knew of his disease or was aware of facts such that he should 
have known of it, i.e., foreseeability.161 The problem with this 
standard is that many people who carry sexual diseases do not 
know that they have a disease, but shielding them from liabil-
ity based on their own ignorance is contrary to the public policy 
of protecting the public from contagious diseases. The factual 
issues surrounding the determination of whether the defendant 
“knew or should have known” that he was infected, e.g., symp-
toms of disease, have given rise to the most successful defense 
in sexual disease cases: the “I did not know I had it” defense.162 
 
 159. See, e.g., Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 689 (Ala. 1989); Kathleen 
K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“[C]onsent to 
sexual intercourse vitiated by one partner’s fraudulent concealment of the risk 
of infection with venereal disease . . . is equally applicable today, whether or 
not partners involved are married to each other.”); Long v. Adams, 333 S.E.2d 
852, 855 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); McPherson, 712 A.2d at 1046; Milbank Ins. Co., 
484 N.W.2d at 57; R.A.P., 428 N.W.2d at 108 (“[P]eople suffering from genital 
herpes generally have a duty either to avoid sexual contact with uninfected 
persons or, at least, to warn potential sex partners that they have herpes be-
fore sexual contact occurs.”); Smith v. Walker, 11 Pa. D. & C. 4th 663, 664–65 
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1991). 
 160. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564, 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
 161. Leary, supra note 2, at 53 & nn.17–18. For example, in Hamblen v. 
Davidson, 50 S.W.3d 433 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), the husband claimed that he 
owed no duty not to transmit herpes to his wife, but the court found that a 
question of material fact existed as to what the husband knew about his 
health condition and failed to tell his wife, which precluded summary judg-
ment for the husband. Id. at 435, 439. Foreseeability is crucial to defenses 
such as contributory negligence and assumption of the risk (often analyzed as 
comparative fault). See DOBBS, supra note 4, at 534–39. 
 162. This factual claim by the defendant destroys foreseeability and there-
fore duty (and proximate cause, which turns on foreseeability) in negligence-
based claims. For example, in one case in which a woman sued her ex-husband 
for transmittal of genital herpes, the central issue was whether there was suf-
ficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the defendant knew, or 
should have known, that he was putting his wife at risk at the time he en-
gaged in sexual relations with her. Meany v. Meany, 639 So. 2d 229, 235 (La. 
1994). The evidence included the following: the defendant had contact with 
multiple sexual partners during a period of separation from the plaintiff; the 
plaintiff ’s first symptoms occurred after reconciliation with the defendant; 
and, when the plaintiff confronted the defendant with her herpes diagnosis, 
the defendant admitted that he had experienced a problem with penile “drip-
page” and had seen a doctor about it. Id. at 231–32. The fact that he had mul-
tiple sexual partners during a short period of separation did not establish the 
foreseeability necessary to allow a finding of negligence in and of itself, but 
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Realistically, most sexual disease transmission is perpetrated 
by persons whose sexual behavior predictably results in disease 
transmission.163 As a practical reality, disease perpetrators 
have constructive notice that they are creating an unreasonable 
risk of harm to others on account of their sexual practices. Yet, 
courts have been reluctant to impose liability based on con-
structive notice. 
Negligence analysis undermines public policy because it is 
fact-specific, puts the plaintiff ’s sexuality on trial, and allows 
defendants to behave irresponsibly, claim ignorance, and ex-
ternalize all of the costs of their sexual behavior not just to the 
victim, but to society at large (through health insurance and 
public aid). Not only is the current negligence paradigm failing 
to deter irresponsible sexual behavior, it actually discourages 
the most sexually active “core” group members from getting 
tested, because in avoiding testing they also avoid any proof of 
knowledge of their disease.164 Tort law should encourage poten-
tial disease perpetrators to be tested and to behave responsibly 
to avoid disease transmission, rather than giving them a de-
fense rooted in their own ignorance. Although causation may be 
difficult to establish in some cases, adopting a strict duty of 
 
helped to establish the link between drippage and a sexual disease. Id. at 235–
36. In another case, a man was held not liable for transmitting AIDS to his 
fiancée because he had no reason to know, based on the information available 
to the public at that time, that his single homosexual experience could have 
resulted in him contracting AIDS. See C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441, 444 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989); see also Delay v. Delay, 707 So. 2d 400, 402 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant-
husband because he claimed no knowledge that he had a sexually transmitted 
disease, and no evidence was presented to prove that he knew); McPherson, 
712 A.2d at 1046 (finding that an ex-husband did not breach a duty of care to 
his ex-wife by transmitting human papilloma virus to her because he did not 
know he had it at the time he infected her); R.A.P., 428 N.W.2d at 108 (re-
manding the case for a determination of whether the defendant informed her 
husband that she had herpes before marriage and before he contracted herpes 
(she said), or after marriage and after he contracted herpes (he said)); Doe v. 
Roe, 598 N.Y.S.2d 678, 680–81 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 1993) (dismissing the claim be-
cause there was no proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defen-
dant knew she had chlamydia at the time she had sex with her boyfriend); 
Smith v. Speligene, 990 P.2d 312, 315 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999) (reasoning that 
the existence of a duty turned in part on the factual question of whether the 
defendant knew she had a contagious disease that could be transmitted to her 
ex-boyfriend). 
 163. See supra Part I.C. 
 164. Professor Mekel explains that the most logical way to prove knowl-
edge of a disease is to obtain the defendant’s medical records showing disease 
diagnosis; one way of avoiding such a showing of fault is to avoid diagnosis. 
See Mekel, supra note 143, at 953. 
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care would avoid the most difficult analysis relating to foresee-
ability in current sex tort jurisprudence.165 
2. Intentional Theories 
Sometimes plaintiffs in sexual disease transmission cases 
have sought remedies under intentional tort theories. Courts 
have held that actions for fraud and battery may lie where the 
plaintiff can show that the defendant intended to deceive the 
plaintiff regarding a sexual disease and the plaintiff justifiably 
relied on the defendant’s misrepresentations in consenting to 
sex, contracting a sexual disease as a result. Specifically, fraud 
claims in which the plaintiff contracts a sexually transmitted 
disease from the defendant require a showing that the defen-
dant made some representation about his health that was un-
true, that the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation in agree-
ing to engage in sexual relations, and that the plaintiff was 
infected as a result.166 The crucial issues in fraud claims are 
whether the defendant knew of his disease and whether he 
made false representations for the purpose of inducing the 
plaintiff to have sex.167 Similarly, battery cases involving sex-
 
 165. Cause-in-fact could conceivably erect huge obstacles to recovery where 
a plaintiff has multiple sexual partners, as it is not always possible to deter-
mine which partner transmitted the disease to the other through medical test-
ing. See, e.g., Doe, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 680 (stating that there was no more proof 
that the defendant transmitted chlamydia to the plaintiff than there was proof 
that the plaintiff transmitted it to the defendant). However, cause in fact has 
rarely been an issue in published cases. 
 166. See Leary, supra note 2, at 189–90. The elements for fraud are: (1) 
false representation by the defendant; (2) the defendant knew the representa-
tion was false or made it with reckless indifference to its truth or falsity; (3) 
the representation was made for the purpose of inducing another to rely on it; 
(4) the plaintiff relied on the representation, had the right to rely on it (it was 
reasonable to rely on it), and would not have done the thing from which the 
damage resulted in the absence of the representation; and (5) the plaintiff suf-
fered damages as a result. See, e.g., B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175, 1182 (Md. 
1988). Note that the defendant’s omission may also be sufficient if he knew of 
a disease and failed to disclose it. See R.A.P., 428 N.W.2d at 108; Plaza v. Es-
tate of Wizer, 626 N.Y.S.2d 446, 449, 452 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (addressing a 
case in which the homosexual defendant failed to tell his partner, the plaintiff, 
that his former partner died of AIDS, and the plaintiff contracted HIV from 
the defendant). 
 167. See, e.g., B.N., 538 A.2d at 1182–84 (finding a cause of action for fraud 
where a nurse alleged that a doctor had genital herpes and was aware of his 
disease and nonetheless had sex with her without telling her, causing her to 
contract herpes); R.A.P., 428 N.W.2d at 108–09 (finding that fraudulent trans-
mission of herpes can be stated upon a showing that the defendant knew she 
had the disease and was silent, allowing the plaintiff to contract the disease); 
Dubovsky v. Dubovsky, 725 N.Y.S.2d 832, 837 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) (stating 
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ual disease turn on the concept that a plaintiff ’s consent to sex 
is vitiated based on a defendant’s misrepresentation or failure 
to disclose a disease; the defendant’s knowledge of his disease 
and intent to expose his partner to the disease must be shown 
for consent to be vitiated via fraud or mistake.168 Intentional 
infliction of emotional distress requires a showing that the de-
fendant acted intentionally or recklessly in giving the plaintiff 
a disease.169 Once again, absent proof that the defendant knew 
of his disease, a plaintiff is unlikely to prevail.170 
The fault element under these intentional tort theories is 
harder to prove than the fault element in negligence cases, 
since a finding that the defendant “should have known” of his 
disease may be sufficient for negligence, while actual knowl-
edge is required for intentional torts. Considering the difficulty 
in proving the defendant’s knowledge of his disease, these in-
tentional tort theories are even less effective at deterring sex-
ual misconduct and compensating disease victims than negli-
gence theory. 
III.  STRICT LIABILITY FOR TRANSMITTING  
A SEXUAL DISEASE   
“Although loathe to create new causes of action in tort, the law 
must nevertheless adapt to the society in which it exists.”171 
 
 
that one spouse failing to tell the other of a sexual disease can constitute 
fraud). 
 168. See, e.g., Leleux v. United States, 178 F.3d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that an officer’s fraudulent concealment of a disease that he transmit-
ted via intercourse vitiated consent, so that sexual contact constituted bat-
tery); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); 
Hogan v. Tavzel, 660 So. 2d 350, 352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing 
that a wife’s consent to sex with her husband was vitiated by his failure to in-
form her of his genital warts, and the wife’s consent without knowledge was 
the equivalent of no consent); De Vall v. Strunk, 96 S.W.2d 245, 246–47 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1936). 
 169. See, e.g., B.N., 538 A.2d at 1179–81 (recognizing that a claim for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress may be stated where the plaintiff 
shows that the defendant knew of his disease and presents proof of the other 
elements of the claim); Leary, supra note 2, at 193–94. 
 170. See Doe, 598 N.Y.S.2d at 692–93. 
 171. Silver v. Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., 692 N.Y.S.2d 886, 887 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1999) (holding that a wrestler who contracted herpes from another 
wrestler during a wrestling match stated a cause of action for negligent 
transmission of a disease). 
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Strict liability is liability without fault. That is, the defen-
dant may be liable for conduct that is neither negligent nor in-
tentional, based on principles of social justice and public policy 
which may have nothing to do with wrongdoing or punishment. 
These principles emerge from an analysis of a number of fac-
tors, including: maximizing control of a public health threat; 
fair allocation of costs, including cost-effectiveness of risk allo-
cation (who is the cheapest cost-avoider); deterrence of cost-
producing behavior; blameworthiness; and legal precedent. 
There are two basic questions that must be addressed be-
fore imposing a strict duty not to transmit a sexual disease: 
first, is the duty consistent with social justice; and second, will 
the duty advance public policy by slowing the spread of sexual 
diseases? 
A. DOES STRICT LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL DISEASE TRANSMISSION 
FURTHER SOCIAL JUSTICE? 
In assessing fairness, the question is whether negligence or 
strict liability is more fair to the parties involved and to society 
at large. Fairness is always a relative question when someone 
must suffer a loss, and strict liability imposes costs on a class of 
persons who cause harm, rather than imposing liability on a 
case-by-case basis as in the negligence paradigm. 
Strict liability is superior to negligence from the perspec-
tive of individual and societal fairness and under an economic 
analysis of law grounded in cost-avoidance. In order to maxi-
mize public protection, strict liability is imposed for many vio-
lations of law, such as health and safety regulations, traffic 
laws, and narcotics control laws; intent is not required because 
the underlying purpose of these laws is public protection.172 In-
deed, strict liability already exists relative to sexual activity re-
sulting in pregnancy: there is no excuse for avoiding child sup-
port payments upon proof of paternity.173 Many states already 
 
 172. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) 
(“Such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal 
conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing—in the interest of the larger good it 
puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but 
standing in responsible relation to a public danger.”). 
 173. The Family Support Act of 1988 adjusted the cost-benefit analysis of 
unprotected sexual activity by creating better enforcement mechanisms to 
force non-custodial parents to pay child support, whether married to the 
child’s custodial parent or not, thereby forcing the non-custodial parent to in-
ternalize child care costs that otherwise would remain external to them. See 
Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 101, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988) 
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have criminal penalties for transmitting a sexual disease.174 
While some states have not allowed negligence per se liability 
resulting from violation of these criminal laws (a species of 
strict liability, as duty and breach issues are pre-determined by 
the legislature), others have indicated a willingness to recog-
nize negligence per se liability. For example, it is a felony in 
Oklahoma to transmit a sexual disease, and civil damages have 
been allowed in reliance on the felony statute.175 Therefore, 
 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 666 (2000)). This is true even where con-
ception results from a party’s contraceptive fraud, no doubt because allowing 
damages would divest the mother of the very funds required to support the 
child. See Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 684 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001); L. Pamela P. 
v. Frank S., 451 N.Y.S.2d 766, 766–67 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Sorrel v. Henson, 
No. 02A01-9609-00212, 1998 WL 886561, at *3–4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 
1998); Linda D. v. Fritz C., 687 P.2d 223, 227–28 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984); Anne 
M. Payne, Annotation, Sexual Partner’s Tort Liability to Other Partner for 
Fraudulent Misrepresentation Regarding Sterility or Use of Birth Control Re-
sulting in Pregnancy, 2 A.L.R. 5th 301, 311–12 (1992). 
 174. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-519 (West 2004); State v. 
Lankford, 102 A. 63, 64 (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1917). 
 175. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-519 (West 2004) (“It shall be 
unlawful and a felony for any person, after becoming an infected person and 
before being discharged and pronounced cured by a physician in writing, to 
marry any other person, or to expose any other person by the act of copulation 
or sexual intercourse to such venereal disease or to liability to contract the ve-
nereal disease.”). This law appears to be identical, or nearly identical, to a law 
existing since at least 1921. See COMP. STAT. OKLA. ANN. § 9008 (Bunn 1921); 
see also Lockhart v. Loosen, 943 P.2d 1074, 1078 (Okla. 1997) (implying that 
an Oklahoma statute could support negligence per se liability); Panther v. 
McNight, 256 P. 916, 918 (Okla. 1926) (awarding civil damages based on the 
statute). Prior to 1995, California Health and Safety Code Section 3198, en-
acted in 1957, provided that, “any person . . . who exposes any person to or in-
fects any person with any venereal disease . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.” 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3198 (West 1990) (repealed 1995) (current ver-
sion at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120600). No case has addressed the 
issue of whether a violation of this statute results in liability based on a theory 
of negligence per se. New York Public Health Law Section 2307 provides: “Any 
person who, knowing himself or herself to be infected with an infectious vene-
real disease, has sexual intercourse with another shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor.” N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2307 (McKinney 2002).  
In Maharam v. Maharam, the court stated that a husband had a duty to 
tell his wife that he had become infected with herpes, based on the thirty-one-
year marital relationship, and failure to do so states a cause of action for con-
structive, if not actual, fraud. 510 N.Y.S.2d 104, 107 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). 
The court stated that the duty to speak could also be predicated upon Section 
2307 based on negligence per se. Id. An Alabama statute provides: “Any per-
son afflicted with a sexually transmitted disease who shall knowingly trans-
mit, or assume the risk of transmitting, or do any act which will probably or 
likely transmit such disease to another person shall be guilty of a Class C 
misdemeanor.” ALA. CODE § 22-11A-21(c) (LexisNexis 1990) In Berner v. 
Caldwell, a woman brought an action against her former boyfriend for alleg-
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strict liability for sexual disease transmission is not a radical 
departure from existing law, but rather a predictable departure 
necessitated by public health policy. 
General social justice policies surrounding imposition of 
strict tort liability, both historical and economic, support im-
posing strict liability for transmitting a sexual disease.176 As a 
basic rule, as between two innocent parties, the person causing 
harm should pay the costs of harm rather than the person who 
 
edly giving her herpes. 543 So. 2d 686, 686 (Ala. 1989). The court stated: 
That civil liability, to be determined according to the traditional rules 
of tort law, should also attach to allow recovery for damages resulting 
from the transmission of a sexually transmitted disease is a natural 
corollary to the legislative will as statutorily expressed. With the rise 
in the number of reported cases of sexually transmitted diseases, and 
in view of the harm that results from these diseases, the imposition of 
such civil liability is clearly warranted. 
Id. at 689 (emphasis added).  
In Mussivand v. David, the court interpreted Ohio Revised Code section 
3701.81(A) and rejected the plaintiff ’s argument that the statute created neg-
ligence per se liability, finding that the statute was merely a “rule of conduct.” 
544 N.E.2d 265, 271–72 (Ohio 1989). A Florida statute provides that it is 
unlawful to knowingly transmit a sexually transmitted disease. FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 38.24 (West 2002).  
Similarly, in Gabriel v. Tripp, the court reversed the appellate court’s de-
cision that violation of the statute constituted negligence per se. 576 So. 2d 
404, 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The court stated that in order for a viola-
tion of a statute to constitute negligence per se, the violation must relate to a 
particular injury and a particular class of persons. Id. The court relied on a 
legislative declaration of intent that stated that sexually transmitted diseases 
are a “threat to the public and individual health and welfare of the people of 
the state,” and that such language shows that the statute was not designed to 
protected a “particular class of persons, but rather the public in general.” Id. 
The court held that a violation of the statute nonetheless presented prima fa-
cie evidence of negligence, but not absolute proof of negligence. Id.  
A Louisiana statute makes it unlawful for a person to inoculate or infect 
another person in any manner with AIDS or to do any act that will expose an-
other to inoculation or infection with AIDS. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 
(1997). The Louisiana Supreme Court in Meany v. Meany relied on Mussivand 
to conclude that the statute merely states a rule of conduct. 639 So. 2d 229, 
235 (La. 1994). 
 176. Prior to 1850, American courts followed the English common law rule 
that direct physical injury to another’s person entailed strict liability, but be-
ginning in 1850 in Massachusetts, courts began necessitating a showing of 
fault for recovery for personal injury, even if the injury was direct. Brown v. 
Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 295–98 (1850). Since sexual disease results 
from direct contact, a common law trespass action should lie, although most 
trespass cases involved “unauthorized” use of physical force, which could ex-
clude consensual sexual relations despite the direct nature of the injury. See 
DOBBS, supra note 4, at 259–66; Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liabil-
ity, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 152–53 (1973) (arguing that the shift from strict li-
ability to negligence was based on moral, not economic, grounds). 
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is harmed. This result is particularly fair where the risk cre-
ated by the injurer is disproportionate to the risk created by the 
victim. The “paradigm of reciprocity” supports imposing costs 
on the injurer.177 Historically, strict liability has been imposed 
on persons and entities that choose to engage in abnormally 
dangerous activities, or to own wild animals with known dan-
gerous propensities, because these individuals have chosen to 
create a non-reciprocal risk to society. They should pay the 
costs of their chosen pursuits, because avoiding all harm to 
others is not possible: “When an . . . individual . . . engages in 
systematic or repeated activity, . . . some risks are more or less 
typical or characteristic of the activity even when no negligence 
can be shown.”178 Deterrence is also sometimes cited as a rea-
son for strict liability: it encourages persons engaged in abnor-
mally dangerous activities to find safer methods or safer places 
for their activities.179 No fault need be shown because the na-
ture of the activity is known to risk serious bodily harm or 
death to others and there is no way to control that risk alto-
gether.180 For this reason, a plaintiff ’s negligence, or even in-
tentional wrongdoing, has traditionally not barred recovery 
under strict liability.181 
According to the scientific data, a small subgroup of Ameri-
cans is choosing to engage in promiscuous sexual activity, lead-
 
 177. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. 
L. REV. 537, 543–51 (1972). This paradigm assumes that only one of the two 
sexual partners is initially carrying the disease. 
 178. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 909 (discussing enterprise (strict) liability the-
ory). 
 179. Id. at 964–65. 
 180. The Second Restatement of Torts sets forth the following factors to 
consider when determining whether strict liability should be imposed on an 
activity: (a) the creation of a high risk of some harm to the person, land, or 
chattels of others; (b) with a likelihood of great harm; (c) that cannot be 
avoided with reasonable care; (d) the degree to which the activity is uncom-
mon; and (e) the inappropriateness of the particular site. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). Whether the activity benefits the community at 
large so as to outweigh the risks should also be considered. Id. § 520(f ). 
 181. Indeed, the Restatement takes the view that intervention of third par-
ties is a part of the risk of abnormally dangerous activity, at least where the 
third party is not guilty of intentional wrongdoing. See DOBBS, supra note 4, at 
960. Assumption of the risk may be a defense where the plaintiff “knowingly 
and unreasonably” subjects himself to the risk of harm, a condition which re-
quires a true understanding of the nature of the risk and voluntary assump-
tion of it. See Rickrode v. Wistinghausen, 340 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1983) (stating that willful provocation of an animal may provide a defense to 
strict liability); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524(2). 
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ing to a sexual disease epidemic that is costing the American 
public billions of dollars annually.182 The statistically few per-
sons who choose to have sex with a large number of partners 
are creating a high risk of serious bodily harm or even death to 
others that cannot be completely eliminated by exercising rea-
sonable care.183 It is unfair for society at large to pay the price 
for the irresponsible sexual behavior of a small percentage of 
individuals who choose a dangerous lifestyle, particularly since 
their dangerous activity lacks social utility.184 
Liability should be placed on the party to an interaction 
who is in the best position to “make the cost-benefit analysis 
between accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to act 
on that decision once it is made.”185 In the sexual disease con-
text, the parties are often unable to negotiate fairly over who 
should bear the risk of loss, because they lack information. In a 
sense, an information defect is present when neither party is 
aware of the disease. As between a diseased individual and his 
uninfected sexual partner, the diseased person has superior ac-
cess to information regarding his disease and the potential 
costs associated with transmission.186 Diseased persons are 
 
 182. See supra Part I.C. 
 183. See supra Part I.A. While condoms can retard the spread of certain 
sexual diseases, the fastest growing viral disease today, the human papilloma 
virus, is believed not to be controllable by condom usage. See supra note 47 
and accompanying text. In addition, we know that some of the most promiscu-
ous people fail to use condoms regularly. See supra notes 99–101 and accom-
panying text. One reason for strict liability is to coerce those engaged in a high 
risk activity to find safer methods, so strict liability in the sexual disease con-
text could encourage condom usage and thereby reduce the risks of most dis-
eases. 
 184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(f ) (observing that determin-
ing whether an activity is abnormally dangerous involves, among other fac-
tors, “the extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dan-
gerous attributes”); Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 
YALE L.J. 656, 671 (1975) (suggesting that strict liability and collective prohi-
bitions can approach the goal of “optimal deterrence”); Epstein, supra note 
176, at 189 (arguing that liability should be based upon the harm caused 
rather than the reasonableness of the conduct). Unlike businesses that cause 
nuisances, for example, where a balance must be made between social value 
and social cost of the nuisance, there is little or no social utility resulting from 
irresponsible sex leading to the spread of sexual disease. 
 185. Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability 
in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972). 
 186. Even where the diseased person is unaware of his infection, he still 
has superior access to that information compared with the uninfected person, 
and is still “relatively more likely to find out whether avoidance is worth it.” 
Id. at 1061. 
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therefore the cheapest cost-avoiders, so the law should place a 
clear, strict duty not to transmit diseases on them.187 Unin-
fected persons will continue to have an incentive to avoid dis-
ease transmission, as they necessarily internalize the pain and 
suffering and emotional distress resulting from infection. Strict 
liability will simply shift those costs capable of being shifted to 
disease perpetrators and force them to absorb at least some of 
the costs of their behavior, instead of externalizing most of the 
costs to victims and taxpayers. 
From an economic standpoint, strict liability is administra-
tively cheaper than negligence. The negligence paradigm bur-
dens legal analysis in that it “demands evaluation of almost 
everything, but can give precise weight to almost nothing.”188 
The sexual disease cases bear out the truth that negligence 
creates more issues than it solves, inhibits litigation and com-
pensation by its unpredictable application, and focuses on mo-
rality as opposed to the need for compensation and deterrence 
in response to a serious disease epidemic.189 Strict liability 
avoids both the unfairness and the complications created by the 
negligence paradigm because it avoids the difficult fact-finding 
relative to the elements of duty and breach.190 
The plaintiff ’s need for compensation and the defendant’s 
ability to pay have been major considerations supporting the 
imposition of strict product liability.191 While this “deep pocket” 
concept does not support strict liability for sex torts, it is not a 
reason to reject strict liability. The lack of a deep pocket in sex 
tort cases may be a problem whether liability is based on negli-
 
 187. Id. 
 188. Epstein, supra note 176, at 171. 
 189. See supra Part II.B.I. 
 190. Perhaps more importantly, increasing the certainty of liability directly 
impacts disease perpetrators’ individual cost-benefit analysis by increasing the 
potential costs of irresponsible sexual activity, thereby enhancing the deter-
rent effect of law and ultimately reducing the number of cases of disease 
transmission. See infra Part III.B.1. Core group members will most often be 
sued. In the short run, administrative costs could increase as a function of a 
greater number of claims filed in light of the certainty of recovery. That is, the 
universe of claims may be enlarged such that the overall administrative costs 
increase despite the lowered costs of each lawsuit resulting from streamlined 
legal analysis. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 205, 209 (1973). However, more certain liability facilitates set-
tlements, which are cheaper than trials. Thus, any temporary increase in ad-
ministrative costs resulting from more lawsuits will be outweighed by expe-
dited trials, more settlement, and ultimately, less sexual disease transmission 
as a result of strict liability’s deterrent effect. 
 191. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 4, at 975. 
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gence or strict liability, because insurance companies are re-
jecting negligence-based claims arising out of sexual rela-
tions.192 Yet, the number of sex tort actions filed continues to 
increase,193 so sex tort analysis should improve in terms of 
clear standards of liability if not collectability. Although strict 
liability neither advances nor inhibits the plaintiff ’s ability to 
collect on a judgment, it is superior to negligence on other 
bases. 
There may be even more compelling reasons for imposing 
strict liability for sexual disease transmission grounded in so-
cial science. Although there is debate over whether the law im-
pacts social norms, or vice versa, and to what degree, it appears 
clear that when the law converges with public consensus, it is 
most effective as a social engineering tool. Legal doctrine has 
emerged grounded in the belief that promiscuous—even extra-
marital—sex is ubiquitous and thereby arguably socially ac-
ceptable.194 Yet, research shows that the vast majority of 
Americans are not promiscuous and presumably do not condone 
promiscuity.195 Sex tort law should converge with public con-
sensus to maximize the effectiveness of both. The next section 
will review deterrence, norm creation, and regulation theories, 
concluding that strict liability is superior to negligence because 
it more powerfully deters sexual disease transmission and more 
accurately expresses social values. 
B. WILL ADOPTING STRICT LIABILITY DETER SEXUAL DISEASE 
TRANSMISSION? 
For centuries, there has been a debate about whether the 
law impacts human behavior, and if so, how?196 Some tort 
 
 192. For example, State Farm Insurance homeowners’ policies in Texas 
and at least some other states contain exclusions for all communicable dis-
eases, including sexually transmitted diseases. Interview with Sophie Har-
bert, State Farm Ins., in Austin, Tex. (August 10, 2005). More generally, the 
insurance industry is expected to deny liability for sexually transmitted dis-
eases. Interview with Loretta Wortes, Vice President, Ins. Info. Inst., in New 
York, N.Y. (Aug. 12, 2005). 
 193. See Ellen Rosner Feig, Can You Sue over Transmission of a Sexual 
Disease?, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/articles/article_content/ 
article14106.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2006). 
 194. See supra Part II.B. 
 195. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 196. There are fundamental concerns about whether law impacts behavior 
at all, grounded in different philosophies about the etiology of misconduct. For 
example, positivists believe that behavior is grounded in biological make up. 
See generally HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
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scholars posit that the law reflects society’s values,197 while 
others posit that the law can be used as a tool of social engi-
neering to shape society’s values.198 The answer may lie some-
where in between; perhaps the relationship between law and 
societal values is symbiotic and fluid. There is no doubt that ra-
tional people respond to legal rules to avoid sanctions where 
the rules are tailored to maximize public awareness and risk 
aversion.199 Thus, while scholars sometimes claim that morality 
cannot be legislated,200 at least some “moral” behavior has been 
 
DEVIANCE 3–6 (1963) (describing various definitions of deviance, including the 
premise that deviance is based on inherent defects); David T. Lykken, Psycho-
path, Sociopathy, and Crime, 34 SOCIETY 29, 29–35 (1996) (describing a psy-
chopath as a person whose antisocial behavior is the result of a defect within 
himself rather than a result of rearing, and detailing different theories of psy-
chopathy); Nicole Hahn Rafter, Criminal Anthropology in the United States, 
30 CRIMINOLOGY 525, 535–37 (1992) (describing criminal anthropology, as in-
fluenced by Lombardo, as ascribing to the “born criminal” theory). Cesare 
Lombroso, the father of criminology, expanded on the concept of biological de-
terminism. See Lykken, supra, at 28–31. Organic and biological psychological 
theories attribute behavior to brain dysfunction or molecular biology, respec-
tively, undermining the concept that the law is effective to change human be-
havior by positing that people inherit criminal traits and are “born criminals.” 
See, e.g., BECKER, supra, at 21; Lykken, supra, at 29; Rafter, supra, at 525. On 
the other end of the spectrum is classical criminology, grounded in the prevail-
ing philosophy of utilitarianism in the mid-eighteenth century, which has 
evolved into rational choice and deterrence theories, and which posits that 
criminals are rational and use available information concerning costs and 
benefits of crime in order to determine whether crime is worthwhile. See gen-
erally JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 151–54 (1948) (describ-
ing the theoretical foundations of classical criminology, involving speed, 
certainty, and mildness); Francis Edward Devine, Cesare Beccaria and the 
Theoretical Foundations of Modern Penal Jurisprudence, 7 NEW ENG. J. 
PRISON L. 8, 13–21 (1982) (describing the influence pleasure and pain have 
over people). While there are probably many factors that give rise to antisocial 
behavior, the law necessarily relies on rational choice and deterrence theories, 
because without the basic concept that legal punishment impacts behavior, the 
law as a tool of social engineering would be worthless. See Daniel W. Shuman, 
The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115, 123 (1993) 
(suggesting that clear, understandable legal standards are important to en-
courage people to modify their behavior). 
 197. See, e.g., Marshall S. Shapo, In the Looking Glass: What Torts Schol-
arship Can Teach Us About the American Experience, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1567, 
1569 (1995) (suggesting that tort jurisprudence reflects society’s basic princi-
ples). 
 198. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See, e.g., Jennifer E. McDougal, Comment, Legislating Morality: The 
Actions for Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation in North Caro-
lina, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 163, 163 (1998) (arguing that the alienation of 
affection cause of action should be abolished in North Carolina because it is 
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proven to be amenable to manipulation through law.201 It is 
therefore fair to assume that the law can impact human behav-
ior.202 
1. Individual Deterrence Based on the Rational Actor 
Assumption 
“[S]ociety has continued to rely on the tort system to provide 
‘general deterrence.’ The threat of tort liability should induce ra-
tional actors to take ‘optimal care’—that is, to reduce the chance 
of accidents to the point at which the cost of any further accident 
prevention measures would exceed the injury losses they would 
prevent. Optimal care thus minimizes the sum of accident costs. 
Optimal deterrence of tortious conduct—of inefficient risk-
taking—is the system’s dominant utilitarian function.”203 
 
Some commentators consider economic analysis of law the 
most powerful influence on legal doctrine in the past half cen-
tury.204 Economic analysis of law relies on criminal deterrence 
theory’s “rational actor” assumption205 and provides a funda-
 
based on obsolete theories and continues merely as a way for the state to legis-
late morality). 
 201. For example, drunk driving behavior has been proven to be controlla-
ble to a substantial degree through increased, well-publicized legal sanctions. 
See infra notes 210–12 and accompanying text. 
 202. All economists, including those persons making predictions about the 
law’s impact on behavior grounded in the rational actor assumption, make as-
sumptions. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECO-
NOMICS 2 (3d ed. 2003) (“The truth [about economists] is that they approach 
problems by making assumptions. The lie is that they make ridiculous as-
sumptions (though, unfortunately, this is not always a lie).”). 
 203. David A. Fischer, Proportional Liability: Statistical Evidence and the 
Probability Paradox, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1201, 1204 (1993) (quoting David 
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” 
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851, 861–62 (1984)). 
 204. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral 
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2000) (suggesting that legal academic thought is 
permeated by the concern of law and economics with how actors respond to 
legal directives). 
 205. The majority of philosophical writings on human conduct are 
grounded in criminology, no doubt because controlling the most offensive, 
dangerous human conduct is a priority in any society. See Shuman, supra note 
196, at 116 & n.5. These theories are closely related to the efficacy of tort law, 
because tort law, like criminal law, involves socially unacceptable conduct that 
government attempts to control through law. Indeed, the first time a court 
awarded damages was in a criminal matter. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS 8 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984). 
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mental truth about human behavior: people respond to incen-
tives (a general statement of price theory).206 At the root of eco-
nomic theory is the expectation that humans will seek ration-
ally to maximize their expected utility or self-interest. This 
concept is usually referred to as “rational choice theory.”207 Ra-
tional choice theory relies on the assumption that the law 
shapes behavior by “taxing” socially undesirable behavior and 
“subsidizing” socially desirable behavior.208 
Classical deterrence theory predicts that the efficacy of a 
legal sanction to modify behavior “rests on perceptions of cer-
tainty, swiftness and severity of formal punishment following 
violation of the law.”209 Deterrence theory posits that if the 
probability of being caught and suffering negative conse-
quences is high enough, people will choose not to engage in 
conduct that results in sanctions.210 The evidence that sane 
people do indeed consider the risk of being punished for their 
conduct is compelling. For example, people who believe that 
they will be punished for future crimes say that they will not 
commit future crimes,211 and robbers choose their victims and 
locations carefully to maximize their chances of escape.212 
 
 206. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 204, at 1054. 
 207. Id. at 1055, 1060–66. 
 208. See id. at 1054; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 903, 951 (1996). 
 209. Dale E. Berger & William D. Marelich, Legal and Social Control of Al-
cohol-Impaired Driving in California: 1983–1994, 58 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 
518, 518 (1997). 
 210. See Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsiv-
ity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: The-
ory and Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865, 866 (2001). 
 211. See id. at 877 (indicating that each 10% increase in sanction probabil-
ity reduces the test subjects’ probability of committing the offense by 3.3%). 
 212. See JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED 
DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 141–59 (1986) (sug-
gesting that robbers choose victims based on tactical considerations such as 
the victim’s vulnerability); Richard B. Felson & Steven F. Messner, To Kill or 
Not to Kill? Lethal Outcomes in Injurious Attacks, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 519, 541 
(1996) (finding that felons are concerned about armed victims). Robbers also 
generally pick the time of day carefully and rob commercial establishments 
where the most cash is on hand, such as bars, supermarkets, and restaurants 
or, more generally, during the Christmas season. They also tend to target 
places close to home so that they are familiar with streets and escape routes. 
John J. Gibbs & Peggy Shelly, Life in the Fast Lane: A Retrospective View by 
Commercial Thieves, 19 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 229, 309 (1982); William R. 
Smith et al., Furthering the Integration of Routine Activity and Social Disor-
ganization Theories: Small Units of Analysis and the Study of Street Robbery 
as a Diffusion Process, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 489, 514 (2000); Peter J. Van Koppen 
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While sexual misconduct differs in some respects from crimes 
like robbery, the general thesis that people tend to maximize 
their “take” and minimize negative consequences—central to 
rational choice theory—applies equally well to impulsive, irre-
sponsible sexual behavior. One of the reasons why sexual mis-
conduct is so rampant, and sexual disease so pervasive, is the 
fact that there is very little chance of suffering any negative 
consequences as a result of such misconduct. Criminal re-
searchers contend that crime persists because criminals believe 
that there is only a small chance of being caught, and if they 
are caught, there is a good chance of receiving lenient punish-
ment.213 
The price or “cost” of crime is a function of the certainty of 
punishment and the severity of punishment.214 Empirical stud-
ies indicate that the certainty of conviction plays a much larger 
role in deterring crime that does severity of punishment.215 
 
& Robert W.J. Jansen, The Time to Rob: Variations in Time of Number of 
Commercial Robberies, 36 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 7, 10–12 (1999). Rapists 
demonstrate rational decision-making in choosing victims and locations. See 
Janet Warren et al., Crime Scene and Distance Correlates of Serial Rape, 14 J. 
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 35, 57 (1998). But see George Lowenstein et al., 
The Effect of Sexual Arousal on Expectations of Sexual Forcefulness, 34 J. RES. 
CRIME & DELINQ. 443, 443 (1997) (arguing that rational choice theory ignores 
the role of emotions or emotional arousal). Illegal drug use, which is similar to 
sexual promiscuity in that both entail pleasure-seeking behavior that may be-
come addictive, is controlled by rational decision-making as well. People begin 
using drugs when they view the costs as minimal (i.e., friends or family also 
abuse drugs, so they are unlikely to be socially ostracized) and the benefits as 
outweighing the costs (the positive drug experience is unlikely to result in 
negative consequences). See John Petraitis et al., Reviewing Theories of Ado-
lescent Substance Use: Organizing Pieces in the Puzzle, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
67, 68–69 (1995). 
 213. Cf. R. Steven Daniels et al., Police Discretion and Elder Mistreatment: 
A Nested Model of Observation, Reporting and Satisfaction, 27 J. CRIM. JUST. 
209, 223 (1999) (discussing the factors influencing police decision-making with 
respect to reporting elder mistreatment). 
 214. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 
83 VA. L. REV. 349, 377–78 (1997). Of course, a high conviction rate is costly to 
the State because it takes resources to prosecute, and the severity of punish-
ment is also costly, especially if it involves costs relating to probation or im-
prisonment. See id. “The standard economic conception of deterrence treats 
severity of punishment and certainty of conviction as interchangeable compo-
nents of the price of crime.” Id. at 377 (citing Gary S. Becker, Crime and Pun-
ishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 184 (1968); Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 
1206 (1985)). 
 215. See Maynard L. Erickson et al., The Deterrence Doctrine and the Per-
ceived Certainty of Legal Punishments, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 305, 306 (1977); Ka-
han, supra note 214, at 379–80; Shuman, supra note 196, at 121. 
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There is apparently a “tipping point,” where certainty of pun-
ishment will work because the likelihood of being caught 
reaches a sufficiently high level: research has found that in-
creasing the severity of punishment leads to a lower crime 
rate,216 but that increasing the severity of punishment may 
have little impact unless the likelihood of getting caught is 
high, because as the likelihood of getting caught decreases, the 
punishment—no matter how severe—tends to be discounted.217 
Accordingly, the law should engage clear liability rules to 
maximize certainty of punishment.218 One way of adjusting the 
“price” of sexual disease transmission is to adopt strict tort li-
ability in lieu of negligence, dramatically increasing the cer-
tainty of civil sanctions if a lawsuit is filed. 
Increasing the cost of socially undesirable conduct to 
minimize that conduct has worked in other contexts in which 
the conduct is not intuitively amenable to legal manipulation. 
For example, over the past twenty-five years, most states sig-
nificantly strengthened laws aimed at controlling alcohol-
impaired driving.219 Time series analyses have demonstrated 
that these changes to the law are associated with the behavior 
changes the laws sought to create, i.e., lower rates of drunk 
driving incidents and accidents.220 Between 1983 and 1994, the 
public’s knowledge of the new drunk driving laws, and particu-
larly the legal blood alcohol concentration limit, increased sub-
stantially.221 The single most important reason people gave for 
avoiding drinking and driving was the fear of getting into an 
accident, and the next five reasons all reflected fear of legal and 
 
 216. See MORGAN O. REYNOLDS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 8–12 
(1995). 
 217. See Nagin & Pogarsky, supra note 210, at 885; H. Laurence Ross et 
al., Can Mandatory Jail Laws Deter Drunk Driving? The Arizona Case, 81 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156, 163–64 (1990); H. Laurence Ross, Implications 
of Drinking-and-Driving Law Studies for Deterrence Research, in CRITIQUE 
AND EXPLANATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GWYNNE NETTLER 159, 168 (Timothy 
F. Hartnagel & Robert A. Silverman eds., 1986). 
 218. See Shuman, supra note 196, at 123. 
 219. From 1981 to 1985 alone, 478 new state laws were passed to control 
drunk driving behavior. Berger & Marelich, supra note 209, at 518. In Califor-
nia, there have been major changes to drunk driving laws since 1982, includ-
ing introducing the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .10% or higher as the 
legal limit, then lowering it to .08% for most adults, and to .01% for persons 
under the legal drinking age of twenty-one; increased fines; and increased jail 
time. Id. 
 220. See id. at 518–20. 
 221. For example, only 34% of Californians knew about the BAC legal limit 
in the mid-1980s, while 56% knew about it in 1994. Id. at 521. 
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monetary punishment: fear of being arrested, going to jail, los-
ing a driver’s license, paying higher insurance premiums, and 
paying legal fines.222 
The trend in alcohol-impaired driving is unambiguous: al-
cohol-related traffic crashes in the United States have de-
creased markedly over the past twenty years, after legislatures 
increased punishment for drunk driving and people became 
educated about the new laws.223 This trend provides at least 
circumstantial evidence that when the costs of drunk driving 
were raised, that behavior was deterred, as predicted by ra-
tional choice theory. The data also supports social control the-
ory; deterrent policies eventually impacted social norms—or 
perhaps revealed them—relating to drinking and driving.224 
Drunk driving and irresponsible sexual behavior have 
some commonalities. Both behaviors are perpetrated by a small 
percentage of Americans who are often young, probably impul-
sive, and relatively unconcerned about existing norms.225 Public 
disapproval regarding these behaviors is, and probably always 
has been, strong, yet not well-recognized until publicized.226 
Both behaviors may also result from addiction, yet this has not 
interfered substantially with the efficacy of new drunk-driving 
 
 222. Id. at 522. 
 223. See id. at 520–23 (finding a decrease in drunk driving due to stricter 
laws in the fifteen years preceding 1997). This finding is consistent with other 
research showing that automobile drivers respond to legal rules, e.g., that li-
ability insurance rates impact the decision whether to drive, and the move to 
no-fault has resulted in more automobile deaths. See Richard A. Posner, Can 
Lawyers Solve the Problems of the Tort System?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 747, 749–50 
(1985). 
 224. An increase in informal control of drunk driving from social forces also 
was clearly apparent from the research. For example, in a recent study, over 
ninety percent of persons indicated that their friends or relatives would disap-
prove of their driving after four drinks. Berger & Marelich, supra note 209, at 
521. “Although it is commonly assumed that the primary impact of laws is to 
instill a fear of punishment [and thereby influence behavior], there is at least 
circumstantial evidence that, over time, laws also influence personal percep-
tions and social norms which in turn control behavior.” Id. at 519. 
 225. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 208, at 918–19 (discussing norm-
flouting and the value some attach to it). Strong sanctions may change the 
value of norm-flouting. 
 226. Most Americans do not engage in sexual relations with many partners 
and presumably do not approve of such behavior. See supra notes 81–84 and 
accompanying text. Regarding drunk driving, it is fair to assume that, consid-
ering the death and destruction that result from it, the vast majority of Ameri-
cans disapprove of it and do not engage in such behavior. See supra notes 223–
24 and accompanying text. 
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laws and would not necessarily undermine new laws strength-
ening consequences for irresponsible sexual behavior. 
There are several important aspects of behavioral theory 
that support strict liability to deter risky sexual practices. 
First, some research indicates that people weigh losses more 
heavily than gains, so laws and the messages they carry must 
exploit humans’ loss aversion tendencies.227 In other words, in-
creasing the salience of potential losses resulting from irre-
sponsible sex—both for disease perpetrators and uninfected 
persons—is more powerful than extolling the virtues of “safe 
sex.”228 As noted by Judge Posner, tort law must be public 
knowledge, because if the public is not aware of the law, the 
law cannot shape future behavior.229 A new regime of strict li-
ability for sexual disease transmission would attract media at-
tention230 and thereby educate the public and increase the sali-
ence of the risks. 
 
 227. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Econom-
ics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1536–37 (1998) (noting that pamphlets emphasiz-
ing the benefits to breast self-examinations to avoid cancer are less effective 
than pamphlets stressing the negative consequences of failing to conduct such 
examinations). 
 228. People are “loss averse” insofar as they will be more unhappy by a loss 
than they will be happy by an equal gain. Sunstein, supra note 208, at 950. 
For example, propagating information that breast self-examinations will save 
lives has been found to be far less effective in motivating breast self-
examinations than propagating information that failure to self-examine can 
lead to death. Id. at 950 n.176 (citing Beth E. Meyerowitz & Shelly Chaiken, 
The Effect of Message Framing on Breast Self-Examination Attitudes, Inten-
tions, and Behavior, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 500, 506–09 (1987)). 
The current “safe sex” campaign is therefore probably less effective than a 
campaign focusing on harms from irresponsible sex, because the latter in-
creases the salience of the risks of unsafe sex instead of focusing on the pre-
sumed value of “safe sex.” 
 229. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 288 (5th ed. 1998). 
 230. The media have exploited sexual disease cases and presumably will 
continue to do so. For example, in 2003 when NFL star Michael Vick gave 
Sonya Elliott, a healthcare worker, herpes, the media exploited the case. See, 
e.g., Steve Wyche, Vick Sued by Woman Genital Herpes Contracted, Alleged 
Ex-girlfriend Claims, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 7, 2005, at D1. Similarly, Mi-
chelle Rudolph’s $950,000 jury verdict against L.A. Dodger pitcher Jose Lima 
for giving her herpes made national headlines. See, e.g., Women [sic] Claims 
He Infected Her with STD, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/ 
story?id=1936811 (last visited Oct. 15, 2006). Although the press coverage 
could be a result of the notoriety of the defendants, at least part of the atten-
tion is due to the unusual nature of these cases. A review of the comments 
posted on Internet sites relating to these stories demonstrates that most peo-
ple are surprised that it is possible to sue someone for transmitting a sexual 
disease. Media attention to cases such as these encourages more lawsuits, 
which in turn creates more news. 
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Second, Americans grossly underestimate the risk of sex-
ual disease and the potential for civil liability because they rely 
on available, salient data rather than the true facts (the “avail-
ability heuristic”).231 They also generally assume that good 
things are more likely than average to happen to them and that 
bad things are less likely than average to happen to them (the 
“overconfidence bias”).232 The public’s ignorance about the 
prevalence of sexual disease233 and the potential for civil liabil-
ity exacerbates the problem of overconfidence bias: people as-
sume they are luckier than average based on a terribly inaccu-
rate belief about the “average” risk. A negligence-based 
analysis for sexual disease cases exacerbates the problems of 
the availability heuristic and the overconfidence bias by reduc-
ing the salience of liability risks. Adopting strict liability would 
increase the salience of both liability and health risks because 
the media would continue to exploit sex tort cases, particularly 
if plaintiffs’ verdicts become more common. 
In sum, strict liability raises the price of sexually risky be-
havior and creates much greater certainty of punishment 
among core group members who statistically will most often be 
defendants in these cases. It reduces plaintiffs’ proof burden by 
eliminating duty and breach analysis, and discourages defen-
dants from remaining ignorant of their sexual diseases or lying 
about them to escape civil liability.234 In addition, adopting 
 
 231. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 204, at 1087 (explaining that actors 
employ the “availability heuristic” when they “overestimate the relevance of 
salient or memorable incidents at the expense of base rates”); see also Jolls et 
al., supra note 227, at 1537 (reasoning that “vivid and personal information 
will often be more effective than statistical evidence” because “as a result of 
the availability heuristic, people will tend to respond to it by attaching a 
higher probability to the event in question”). For example, most Americans 
believe that car accidents kill more people than diabetes and stomach cancer, 
although this belief is grossly inaccurate. The “available” information regard-
ing car accidents comes from greater media coverage, which leads the public to 
believe that deadly car accidents are more prevalent than death from the two 
diseases. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 204, at 1088; see also Jolls et al., supra 
note 218, at 1477–78. 
 232. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 204, at 1091 & nn.149–50. 
 233. See supra Part I.A. (demonstrating that people seriously underesti-
mate the disease rate and their risk of contracting a sexual disease). 
 234. Assumption of the risk is still a viable defense, but to establish this 
defense, a defendant has the burden of showing that the plaintiff knew of the 
disease, understood its consequences, and voluntarily undertook responsibility 
for becoming infected. It seems improbable that any sane person would know-
ingly submit to becoming infected with a sexual disease. Indeed, nearly half of 
men and women surveyed stated that if they were in a new relationship and 
discovered that their partner had an STD, they would be “a lot less likely” to 
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strict liability is newsworthy, and will help to educate the pub-
lic about the high sexual disease rate. 
2. Social Control Models of Deterrence, Behavioral Law 
Theories, and Norms 
“Wicked people exist. Nothing avails except to set them apart 
from innocent people. And many people, neither wicked nor in-
nocent, but watchful, dissembling, and calculating of their 
chances, ponder our reaction to wickedness as a clue to what 
they might profitably do.”235 
 
“[O]ne who violates a consensus incurs a cost.”236 
 
Whether norm237 violation and informal social conse-
quences are considered a nonquantifiable “cost”238 or a more at-
tenuated means of pressuring others to conform to social stan-
dards through vicarious experiences, it is clear that norms 
affect social choices. Humans’ fear of informal sanctions, such 
as disapproval by parents, peers, neighbors, and teachers, in 
the form of embarrassment, shame, and loss of community re-
spect, may have a greater impact than legal punishment per se, 
because people seek social approval.239 Thus, although behavior 
 
continue the relationship. ASHA—WHAT COST?, supra note 2, at 23. Most peo-
ple say they would feel angry at a person who gave them an STD, although 
women are more likely (87%) than men (74%) to say so. See id. 
 235. JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 260 (rev. ed. 1983). 
 236. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of 
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 369 (1997). 
 237. The term “norm” refers to an informal social standard that people fol-
low based on a fear of external non-legal sanctions, such as ostracism, or an 
internalized sense of duty, which can produce guilt, or both. Some people in-
clude formal legal rules in the definition of norms. See id. at 350–51 nn.54–59. 
Cass R. Sunstein defines norms as “social attitudes of approval and disap-
proval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done.” Sun-
stein, supra note 208, at 914. Norms arise from a complex set of social forces, 
including feelings and preferences, religious and cultural mores, and legal 
rules. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 214, at 354; Cass R. Sunstein, On the Ex-
pressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2026–29 (1996). 
 238. Stated alternatively, nonquantifiable benefits include esteem from 
others, a lack of cognitive dissonance (by acting consistent with internal be-
liefs), and a feeling of “belonging” to a social system by complying with norms. 
These benefits are not considered in classic economic analysis of law. See 
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 204, at 1057 (referring to “law and behavioral 
science” as a “species of legal pragmatism,” since it is more useful in setting 
legal policy that will produce a predictable impact on actual human behavior). 
 239. See, e.g., CHARLES TITTLE, SANCTIONS AND SOCIAL DEVIANCE 199–203 
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is guided partly by legal rules and costs of rule-breaking, it is 
also influenced substantially by the relationship between such 
rules and beliefs, values, norms, psychological frames, and cog-
nitive processing.240 The so-called “law and behavioral science” 
movement241 or “behavioral economics”242 is an outgrowth of 
classic law and economics, created to explain the fact that peo-
ple do not always behave in a rational manner to maximize 
their wealth, as would be predicted by price theory, because of 
the influence of norms.243 Since norm sanctions are costless, 
 
(1980); Wanda D. Foglia, Perceptual Deterrence and the Mediating Effect of 
Internalized Norms Among Inner-City Teenagers, 34 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 
414, 437 (1997); Donald E. Green, Past Behavior as a Measure of Actual Fu-
ture Behavior: An Unresolved Issue in Perceptual Deterrence Research, 80 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 781, 803 (1989); Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Pater-
noster, Enduring Individual Differences and Rational Choice Theories of 
Crime, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 467, 489 (1993); cf. Matthew Silberman, Toward a 
Theory of Criminal Deterrence, 41 AM. SOC. REV. 442, 457 (1976) (“The higher 
the degree of moral support for the legal regulation of an offense . . . the lower 
the probability that the offense or offenses will be committed . . . .”). In gen-
eral, women are more likely to fear shame and embarrassment than men. This 
fact may play a role in the gender differences in crime rates—men commit 
more crime. See, e.g., Harold Grasmick et al., Changes in the Sex Patterning of 
Perceived Threats and Sanctions, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 679, 685 (1993). 
 240. Compare Sunstein, supra note 208, at 939–47 (arguing that law can 
affect behavior by affecting the sources of shame, pride and associated norms), 
Sunstein, supra note 237, at 2051 (reasoning that law may attempt to gener-
ate norms that will solve the collective action problem), and McAdams, supra 
note 236, at 397–409 (noting that the expressive function of law works by af-
fecting norms), with Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital 
Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2073–76 (1996) (arguing that the law 
may have a “norm-destroying capacity” rather than a “norm-producing capac-
ity”). 
 241. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 204, at 1057. 
 242. See Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and 
the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1553 (1998) (“Behavioral economics rejects 
the assumption that people are rational maximizers of preference satisfaction 
in favor of assumptions of ‘bounded rationality,’ ‘bounded willpower,’ and 
‘bounded self-interest.’”). One example of bounded rationality is documented 
by the fact that people often put a higher value on objects that they own as op-
posed to objects that they do not own, even though the objects have the same 
objective value. That is, people tend to value the loss of items they already 
own higher than equivalent gains of items they seek to buy. This is known as 
the “endowment effect” or the “offer/asking gap,” and it appears to show that 
people find some sort of value above market value in items they own, which 
may result from feelings about ownership, or more generally, from a desire to 
maintain the status quo. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 204, at 1107–13; see 
also Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision 
Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 
1503–04 (1998) (reasoning that people have a desire to maintain the status 
quo because they are somewhat inert). 
 243. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 204, at 1102–03 (describing the 
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they are an especially efficient tool for expressing social values 
and shaping social choices.244 
People’s decisions about whether to abide by the law turn 
on their perception of others’ attitudes toward the law;245 that 
is, the meaning of behavior is highly contextual, and people 
tend to choose behavior based on their perception of what oth-
ers are doing.246 A perception that “everyone is doing it” can be-
come self-fulfilling, and a parallel perception of little risk of be-
ing caught will arise, lessening the risk of stigma or 
 
$10 play ticket study as illustrative of the role context plays in decision-
making). 
 244. See McAdams, supra note 236, at 355–65. Sunstein posits that the “ex-
pressive” function of law can strengthen norms the law embodies and weaken 
those it condemns, such as by taxing socially undesirable conduct and subsi-
dizing socially desirable choices. See Sunstein, supra note 208, at 951; Sun-
stein, supra note 237, at 2026–33. Lawrence Lessig argues that legislators and 
judges must understand the social meaning of the behavior sought to be regu-
lated, because it is impossible to make policy decisions relating to legal sanc-
tions of social behavior without understanding how the law interacts with so-
cial meaning. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 943, 946–58, 1019 (1995); Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and 
Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181, 2183–84 (1996). 
 245. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 214, at 354–55 & nn.18–20. For example, 
neighborhood crime rates are a much better predictor of individual delin-
quency than social class, probably because of the neighborhood perception that 
crime is common and therefore not particularly stigmatizing. Id. at 355 & 
nn.21–23. In another study, British efforts to control drunk driving by sham-
ing offenders produced a climate of moral awareness that helped to reduce the 
incidence of drunk driving. John R. Snortum, Drinking-Driving Compliance in 
Great Britain: The Role of Law as a “Threat” and as a “Moral Eye-Opener,” 18 
J. CRIM. JUST. 479, 495–97 (1990). The impact of informal sanctions varies, of 
course, depending on the size and cohesiveness of the community involved, 
which directly impacts whether the misconduct results in public disapproval. 
Thomas A. Peete et al., Levels of Social Integration in Group Contexts and the 
Effects of Informal Sanction Threat on Deviance, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 85, 99 
(1994). At least in some circumstances, such as a rural ranching community 
governed by longstanding community codes of conduct and informal dispute 
resolution, norms govern behavior irrespective of legal rules, rendering the 
formal law surprisingly unimportant, and not even of interest to the parties 
involved. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SET-
TLE DISPUTES 40–64 (1991). 
 246. For example, open signs of disorder in a vicinity, such as prostitution, 
public drunkenness, and panhandling signal to others that disorderly conduct 
is commonplace, accepted, and/or that the government cannot control it. Ka-
han, supra note 214, at 371–73. This perception in turn leads people to think 
that the chances of being punished are low, and that esteem costs for violating 
laws are also low (everyone is doing it). Id. In such an environment, persons 
who would otherwise be unlikely to engage in such conduct are more likely to 
do so because of these perceptions. Id. at 371. Other research shows that when 
people have recently seen others engage in responsible behavior relative to lit-
tering, they are less likely to litter. See Sunstein, supra note 208, at 905. 
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ostracism.247 Accordingly, if a consensus exists, but it is con-
trary to the public’s perception of the consensus, a norm consis-
tent with the consensus will not arise.248 The reason some 
Americans engage in irresponsible sex leading to disease is 
probably not because such behavior is consistent with the na-
tional consensus or that there is no national consensus, but 
that the consensus is not well-known, destroying its normative 
power.249 
The media’s preoccupation with sex and portrayal of casual 
sex as the norm contribute to this misperception,250 as does the 
deeply internalized, unconscious Puritanical shame that tends 
to silence discourse regarding the content of sexual norms. The 
core group responsible for the sexual disease rate is probably 
 
 247. Kahan, supra note 214, at 356–59 & nn.42–44, 370–71. Kahan argues 
that this is the mechanism that dramatically reduced crime in New York City 
in a mere three year period—the police concentrated on “public order” offenses 
and created an environment where disorder was much less apparent. Id. at 
368–73. In Chicago, the most dramatic reductions in violent crimes occurred in 
the areas in which “the city’s gang loitering ordinance [was] most vigorously 
enforced.” Id. at 377. 
 248. Norm theorist Richard McAdams posits that a norm arises when “(1) 
there is a consensus about the positive or negative esteem worthiness of en-
gaging in [a certain behavior] . . . ; (2) there is some risk that others will detect 
whether one engages in [that behavior]; and (3) the existence of this consensus 
and risk of detection is well-known within the relevant population.” See 
McAdams, supra note 236, at 358. 
 249. There appears to be a gross divergence between Americans’ actual 
sexual behavior (mostly monogamous) and Americans’ perception of Ameri-
cans’ sexual behavior—a misperception that has arisen in large part due to the 
media’s portrayal of promiscuous sex as ubiquitous. See LAUMANN ET AL., su-
pra note 19, at 3–24 (explaining that most people make sexual choices based 
on feelings about what is right or wrong, not based on sexual urges); supra 
note 56 (discussing the media’s portrayal of promiscuous sex); supra note 80 
(discussing data that shows that most people do not engage in promiscuous 
sex). But, even if the percentage of persons engaging in promiscuous sex were 
higher, a strong dissent to a consensus would not preclude norm-formation. 
McAdams, supra note 236, at 358, 379–80. For example, twenty years ago, it 
would be considered “rude” to ask someone to stop smoking in a restaurant, as 
the norm was to allow smoking in public. Then, as restaurants began adopting 
policies against smoking, and local and state lawmaking bodies began to enact 
laws prohibiting smoking in public places, a consensus arose that smoking in 
public was the rude behavior, not the request to cease smoking. The data 
available today regarding the propriety of sexual promiscuity indicate a strong 
consensus against it. But even if a consensus did not already exist, McAdams’ 
analysis of consensus formation predicts that a consensus admonishing sexual 
promiscuity would arise if information regarding the public health threat and 
social costs of disease transmission were better publicized, based on “selfish 
esteem allocation” and other factors. See id. at 359. 
 250. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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influenced by the “false” norms created by contemporary media 
and music, while the majority of Americans may be unaware 
that they are in the majority and exemplify the consensus. 
A similar divergence between the consensus and public 
awareness of the consensus existed relative to public smoking 
before new laws publicized both the health risks and public 
sentiment.251 Prior to the entrenchment of the consensus that 
smoking in public places was unacceptable, people were afraid 
to speak out against public smoking, perhaps not realizing that 
they were in the majority, as smokers disproportionately repre-
sent patrons in bars and restaurants in the same way that 
sexually promiscuous people are disproportionately represented 
on prime time television.252 The “norm-cascades” that have oc-
curred in the last thirty years relating to smoking occurred in 
large part because the public became aware of the adverse 
health consequences of smoking, and because social norms are 
a function of public information.253 
In order to create sexual norms from an existing consen-
sus, it is critical to propagate information that sexual promiscu-
ity is not consistent with the societal consensus and is not con-
doned by society, particularly if certain subgroups—such as 
young Americans—operate under a mistaken belief that pro-
miscuous sexual behavior is the norm.254 Considering the data, 
the only reason core sexual disease perpetrators are not sub-
jected to more outspoken disapproval is likely because of a lack 
of publicity about the public consensus regarding their behav-
ior.255 Publicity of the true consensus is crucial to create and 
 
 251. See McAdams, supra note 236, at 404. 
 252. See, e.g., id. at 370–80. 
 253. Sunstein, supra note 237, at 2035. 
 254. A legal statement about sexually promiscuous behavior is especially 
important to show that a consensus exists that shuns such behavior, as other-
wise young Americans may succumb to the “false consensus” effect; that is, the 
belief that a behavior is typical, even though it is not, because other people in 
their age group, with whom they selectively associate, disproportionately con-
done such behavior. McAdams, supra note 236, at 401; cf. Kahan, supra note 
214, at 373–77 (describing the role that the “false consensus” effect plays in 
gang membership and gang criminality). The first step is to signal to this high 
risk group that the behavior leading to health risks is not consistent with the 
consensus of most Americans, but is aberrational, very dangerous, and en-
gaged in disproportionately among their peers. See McAdams, supra note 236, 
at 402–03. In this way, public smoking became antisocial. Id. at 404–06; see 
supra note 235 and accompanying text.  
 255. There is experimental and empirical data that suggest that people will 
adapt their moral convictions to those of their peers once they know what 
those convictions are, and that such adaptation can occur very rapidly once 
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entrench existing sexual norms. Publicity of the sexual disease 
epidemic per se will strengthen and reaffirm the consensus be-
cause the risks of sexual disease are much more serious than 
most Americans understand. Strict liability will increase pub-
licity of the consensus and health risks, engaging the true 
power of a legal threat—its vicarious deterrent effect.256 
In sum, sexually irresponsible behavior leading to the cur-
rent sexual disease epidemic has been tolerated, even encour-
aged, among certain groups, based on inaccurate assumptions 
that could be exposed through the law’s expressive function. 
The law should seek to exploit Americans’ consensus condemn-
ing sexual disease transmission and to create norms consistent 
with public sentiment and social policy. A strict liability ap-
proach to sexual disease transmission would further the goals 
of educating the public and slowing the spread of sexual dis-
ease. 
  CONCLUSION   
Sex in America has gone through enormous changes in the 
past century as a result of many social forces. Americans cur-
rently face an extraordinarily expensive and dangerous health 
care crisis as a result of the sexual behavior of a small percent 
of Americans. Tort law could do a much better job of encourag-
ing socially responsible sexual behavior than it currently does. 
Adopting strict liability for sexual disease transmission is ap-
propriate because sexual disease perpetrators must be de-
terred. In addition, strict liability will help express Americans’ 
consensus condemning sexual disease transmission and will 
thereby aid in slowing the disease transmission rate through 
informal sanctions. 
 
people are exposed to their peers’ attitudes. Kahan, supra note 214, at 358–59 
& n.44. Increased publicity of the public health risks involved in sexual norm 
violation (irresponsible sex leading to sexual disease) should provide sufficient 
confidence among those conforming to the norm and encourage them to speak 
out, as happened with public smoking. See McAdams, supra note 236, at 404–
06. 
 256. ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION 
330–31 (1986). 
